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Authority Relations and Governmental Performance

A Theoretical Framework

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ABSTRACT

Twelve interrelated hypotheses, presently being investigated through field research in a large number of societies, are presented and explained, together with background on how they came to be formulated and why they appear plausible enough to warrant investigation and testing through cross-national research. The object of the fieldwork is to gather data on social (i. e. non-governmental) authority patterns, using an operationalized analytic scheme of concepts that specifies dimensions of authority relations and how social units vary on them, for describing and comparing the patterns.

The principal hypotheses relate levels of governmental performance to two aspects of political authority patterns, their congruence with certain social authority patterns (hypotheses 1. 1 - 1. 3) and the internal consonance of their elements (hypotheses 2. 1 - 2. 3). The mutual relations between congruence and consonance and their combined effects on governmental performance are also discussed (hypotheses 3 - 7). Other hypotheses deal with the tendencies of authority patterns to change when they are incongruent or dissonant (hypotheses 8 - 12).

The hypotheses constitute a theoretical framework intended to have the following potentials: the construction of a theoretical system of propositions interrelating all the variables used in them; the explanation and anticipation of governmental performance levels and certain processes of political and social change; accounting for the strengths and weaknesses of existing hypotheses about governmental performance using other independent variables; and the reduction of unfounded conjectures and misjudgments in prognoses of the performance prospects of governments and in attempts to alter them.

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This paper presents one aspect of the framework of a research project in comparative political sociology now being carried out by a group of faculty members and graduate students at Princeton University. After summarizing the concerns, reflections, and previous work out of which the project developed, it states and explains the principal hypotheses that the research is intended to investigate. Subsequent reports on the framework of the project will cover the concepts used in it (most of them novel, for reasons that will emerge in the summary of the project's background) and the manner in which the concepts have been "operationalized" to make possible the systematic gathering of pertinent data and the measurements required to evaluate the hypotheses.

I. Background

Objectives

The project has two major goals. It seeks to produce a set of readily comparable data on the nature of social (i. e. non-governmental) authority patterns in a considerable number of societies, western and non-western. It is also intended to evaluate a set of hypotheses in all of which the nature of authority patterns is a crucial variable and the most important of which relates degrees of resemblance among governmental and social authority patterns to the performance of politics.

Authority patterns are sets of interactions among subordinates (s) and superordinates (S), and among the superordinates themselves, in any social unit, insofar as they concern the exercise of superordination. The superordinates of a social unit are those of its members who are nominally and actually in a position to issue and enforce directives in the unit - i. e. prescriptions, potentially backed by sanctions, that members act in an ordained manner. In Dahl's and Lindblom's terms, they are both the nominal "superiors," and, to a large extent at least, the actual "controllers" of the unit.¹ Subordinates are simply those members of a social unit who are not superordinates. The same person may, of course, simultaneously be a "super" and a "sub" in relation to different persons and/or different types of interaction in a social unit.

One major set of aspects of an authority pattern involves interactions among (S) and (s)--"supers" and "subs." In the language we use (but will not explain in this report), this includes such matters as the distance perceived to exist between them and the bases on which distance perceptions rest, their deportment toward one another, a set of "influence" relations among them (the participation and compliance of the subs and the permissiveness and responsiveness of the supers), and the proximity of (S) and (s) in interactions involving authority. A second major set of aspects involves relations among the superordinates themselves, especially characteristics of the structural arrangements and processes through which they typically arrive at directives. This includes the conformation of the structure of superordination, tendencies toward monocratic or collegial leadership, and degrees of concordance in S-S interactions. In addition, authority patterns include processes of recruitment to S-positions and notions of legitimacy associated with the sentiments that supers rightfully, or unrightfully, occupy their positions and that their directives are, or are not, obligatory on the subs.

Authority patterns in this sense can be found in nearly all social units, not just those concerned with government and politics in the conventional sense. They exist in political parties, voluntary associations, economic organizations, schools, universities, families, peer groups--in virtually all collective social life.²

Antecedents of the Project

The desire for data on social authority patterns is not new. For at least two generations political scientists have periodically urged one another to study what Charles Merriam called "private governments,"³ and done so on a variety of grounds, most of them persuasive. Little, however, has been done about these summons to research, even by those who issued them. To be sure, information on social authority relations exists. Authority is so ubiquitous and salient in social structures and interactions, especially complex ones, that it is scarcely possible to describe social units for any purpose without touching on the subject. What is lacking is not information as such but, conceding honorable exceptions,⁴ the study of social authority relations as a specific, explicit research goal, systematically pursued. Three types of literature particularly abound in relevant materials and approach what is needed: studies of political parties,

no doubt because of the influence of Michels' pioneer research on their internal power structures; studies in industrial sociology, which make much of the relations between workplace authority and industrial performance; and family sociology, especially because of its concern with the effects of parental authority on the formation of personality. But even in these fields, authority patterns generally have been only a partial, and often secondary, interest; research in them has chiefly yielded rather unsystematic (although not for that reason superficial) case-studies; and specialists in the study of authority, political scientists, have contributed substantially only to the first of them. One result of this neglect of the subject is that even the descriptive language used to depict social authority relations is presently imprecise, indiscriminating, idiosyncratic to individual writers, and replete with doubtful analogies that result from its being largely drawn either from studies of states or from those of individual personality traits.

Thus, although the project's subject is old, our approach to it, as well as its scale (in terms of people engaged in the work along similar lines and numbers of societies and social units being studied), regrettably are not.

Some novelty can also be claimed for the theoretical purpose of the project. Among political scientists, the professed interest in social authority relations has usually reflected concerns defensible in themselves but different from ours, and less likely to induce systematic empirical study. By far the most important of these concerns have been normative. Some of the earliest recommendations that political scientists study private governments can be traced to the arguments of those "pluralists" who held that the State is an association like any other, and therefore could not validly claim special rights of sovereign power, nor, for that matter, require a special discipline of study. Even more influential has been the view, shared by most pluralists, that personal freedom cannot be equated with political liberties, since governments have no de facto monopoly over the powers and controls constraining men. Closely related is the view that formally granted political liberties and equality are shallow if narrow elites, including the hierarchs of politically strategic organization, actually enjoy a predominant influence on political decisions. Much of the ostensible interest in social authority thus has been rooted in a moral concern with liberal ideals, either to disparage them or to promote their better realization.

A somewhat different set of purposes in the study of social authority can be discerned in redefinitions of political science as the study of control, power or influence relations per se.⁵ Such redefinitions have not been prompted solely by normative considerations. Catlin's, for example, rests mainly on the view that an empirical science requires a far more numerous and simpler subject matter than the study of nation-states provides. In other cases, the governing consideration has been a desire for social theory more general than is attainable through studies of state organizations alone, or for building theories about macrocosmic phenomena from studies of more manageable and accessible microcosmic cases.

The data gathered through the present project ought to be relevant to these, and many other, concerns. Those of its explicit objectives that go beyond accumulating data, however, belong to two quite different realms of inquiry: reflections about the relations between political and non-political life and about the conditions that determine whether politics perform well or badly, in various senses.

Both are venerable topics in political study, now even more widely attended to than in the past. The project's novelty does not lie in raising questions pertinent to them, but in the attempt to answer the questions by systematically linking the performance of politics to those special aspects of non-political life that involve (as normative political theorists have long argued) a close equivalent of political life itself: the patterning of authority in social units. That patterning may itself reflect other factors, e.g. economic, religious, or demographic ones. However, a central premise of the project is that such factors become relevant to political performance chiefly through the intervening variable of social authority relations, and that these relations can vary independently of other conditions.

Even this argument is not wholly unprecedented. Especially in regard to family life, it is implicit in many political doctrines: for example, the Confucian doctrine that the state should be a larger version of the (well-ordered) family. In the writings of some early political sociologists, the notion becomes more explicit and an elementary rationale is provided for it. (An example is this passage from Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws, Book XVIII: "The laws of education are the first impression we receive; and as they prepare us for civil life, every family ought to be governed by the plan of the

great household which comprehends them all"--actually an inversion of Confucianism.) More modern studies have also made much of the political consequences of family authority: for example, those numerous studies (e. g. Schaffner's Fatherland) that trace the troubles of interwar German democracy to the existence of an authoritarian family structure. These precedents, however, have largely centered on family life to the exclusion of other social units; have consisted of cursory allusions amid many brief allusions of other kinds; have involved implicit and unquestioned assumptions rather than explicit, testable (let alone tested) hypotheses; and have presented special interpretations of individual cases rather than generalizations pertinent to many. They provide clues to coherent theory about the impact of social authority patterns on governmental performance, but such theory largely remains to be worked out.

The Project's Prehistory

The summons to study private governments and earlier reflections on the impact of social or political authority patterns did not actually engender the project, although they influenced it at an early stage. Its prehistory--only summarized here--begins with a personal and initially quite unfocused decision to inquire into the conditions of stability or instability in democracies, an interest common among political scientists whose basic political consciousness was formed during the thirties, especially in a European context, and who subsequently witnessed the many disappointing experiments with democracy in developing nations. (Later that interest became fused with a separate, but obviously related, interest in the etiology, processes, and consequences of revolutionary violence, and expanded to include also non-democratic polities.)

The Inventory of Propositions. The first step taken to attack the problem of stable democracy was the compilation of an inventory of relevant propositions in the existing literature; after all, an adequate solution of the problem might already have been propounded. Both comparative studies and studies of individual countries were included in the inventory, and the work was continued until its costs in time and effort were manifestly incommensurate with its yield of new ideas, or old ones based on better evidence or reasoning. The conclusion drawn from it was, in essence, that proper work on the problem had hardly even begun.

There was, to be sure, no dearth of propositions. In fact, we catalogued over 150 distinguishable ones. Their quality, however, hardly matched their quantity. Very few could be comfortably translated into a format stating unambiguously the nature of their x and y-variables and the nature and strength of the relationship between them.⁶ The great majority were hedged by evasive wording, such as "may" (instead of "will" or "must"), "under certain circumstances," (usually unspecified), and so on. None stated necessary, let alone sufficient, conditions (discounting manifest tautologies) and only a few explicitly posited even strong relationships. The bulk of the propositions were inferred from narrative case-studies of particular countries, in fact from studies of only three or four of the larger Western nations, and were rather easily impugned when taken as generalizations pertinent to many. On most inventory sheets, the section on "evidence cited" was distressingly empty or filled in by such question-begging phrases as "considered self-evident" or "held to follow from human nature." The more powerful studies usually were highly multivariate and smacked more than a little of hypothesis-saving. In no case were relative weights or other relationships assigned to the many independent variables used in the propositions; and so many favorable and unfavorable conditions were suggested that, from one point of view, it was hard to see how any democracy might fail, and, from another, how it could succeed. All this aside from unstated "special circumstances," fortunate and mischievous "accidents," or "factors of personality" that could take care of any remaining inconvenient case.⁷ While large-scale comparative studies were mainly based on superficial and easily obtainable aggregate data, deeper and more thorough studies generally made no comparisons at all, or made them offhandedly, using no explicit theoretical frameworks or perspectives to guide inquiry. The very best studies (e.g. Kornhauser's work on mass behavior)⁸ were really concerned with matters only indirectly relevant to the problem. although sometimes concluded with speculative chapters on their more direct implications.⁹ To be sure, progress was discernible in the manner propositions were stated, their coverage, and the evidence and reasoning supporting them. But a need clearly seemed to exist for more powerful, and especially more parsimonious, theory.¹⁰

Prior to working toward this end, it seemed advisable to reflect on possible reasons for the apparent inadequacy of the existing propositions, so that experience might indicate a wiser course. Clearly, matters of methodology and the organization of research were involved, most manifestly in the abundance of inferences from single cases, unsupported speculations, and the tendency warily to hedge, soften and heap up hypotheses to a point of flocculence. It seemed likely, however, that the methodological and procedural inadequacies were themselves engendered by working with inappropriate independent variables. In any event, it was necessary to choose a substantive line of inquiry before deciding on a method for pursuing it. Hence, the main question that immediately arose from the compilation and evaluation of the inventory was whether to continue working with variables already in vogue or to choose, at some risk of compounding chaos, a novel line of inquiry.

An examination of the inventory revealed that, almost without exception, the variables used to account for the stability of democracies could be divided into two broad categories. One comprised propositions relating the stability of governments to the way they were constructed: e.g. among other characteristics, to their electoral systems, legislative structures and procedures, provisions for the dissolution of parliaments or executive emergency powers. Implicit in these propositions was the Enlightenment assumption that governments are mechanisms that work efficiently in any setting if properly engineered in accordance with rules distinctive to themselves. This seemed, on its face, a questionable view, especially in light of the well-known results of constitutional imitation, the weaknesses of the propositions themselves, and the fact that hardly a facet of constitutional structure seemed to have escaped the attention of political scientists concerned with the stability of democracies.

The second category related the dependent variable to strictly non-political aspects of societies, treating political performance, as some post-Enlightenment thinkers treated political arrangements, as mere superstructure registering the ineluctable causation of more fundamental social realities. This may be an obvious alternative to the view that the workings of governments are largely determined by their internal structures, yet also raised serious problems. It seemed unlikely that governmental structure should not signify at all. It also was apparent that no one had yet managed

adequately to demonstrate what the prime social movers of political stability are, yet hardly failed to do so for want of having looked in the right place, since just about every imaginable facet of social life was already represented in the inventory; geography, demographic size and distribution, economic organization and development, social stratification and mobility, education, role structure, and many others.

The Search for a New Approach. The examination of the inventory, being undertaken only to help define a research strategy, hardly compelled seeking out some new category of explanation. Better research and less woolly theories along familiar lines might certainly have yielded better results, it being hard to determine whether the source of inadequacy lay mainly in substantive lines of research or the manner of its doing. Three basic considerations, however, led to a decision to try a novel line of inquiry. It seemed at least as reasonable a tack to take. It would involve an effort not already clouded by failure. And it would not duplicate the research of others still investigating, with increasing rigor and intensity, the traditional variables.

Some of the traits desirable in a new approach to the problem could be abstractly specified in light of the discontents that led to the search for it. The approach should imply neither the causal autonomy nor strict environmental determination of political stability (or other characteristics of polities) and, preferably, avoid these positions by means other than simply combining hypotheses that individually imply them both. Hence, the variable stressed should, in some way, belong neither to governmental nor social structure alone, which implied, in turn, that it should concern characteristics of their interplay. The variable should have the characteristics of a "mediating" variable in another sense as well: it should be able to explain why similar (or different) structural traits of governments or social conditions did not always similarly (or differently) affect the workings of governments, by placing between the familiar x and y-variables another variable held to govern the effects of the x-variables on y. Finally, the new variable should offer the prospect of "higher-order" theory. Although no adequate theory of stable democracy seemed to exist, the inventoried hypotheses were far from equally unsatisfactory. Consequently, any new hypothesis had, ideally, to account for the different degrees of validity in already formulated propositions and to explain both why the better ones among them worked as well as they did and why they did not work better.

Essential Nature of the Approach. What concrete line of inquiry might fulfill these abstract criteria? At first, logic seemed to preclude a tenable answer to this question. If the determinants of democracy's stability were to be located neither in traits of governmental structure, nor in those of the social environment of governments, nor in complex multivariate combinations of the two, then were not all possibilities already ruled out?

At this point, the exhortatory literature on social authority relations suggested a still open possibility. The existing propositions, as stated, either invoked the structural characteristics of polities or strictly non-political aspects of their social environments as independent variables. This left available one alternative: that of locating the determinants of governmental stability precisely in those aspects of non-governmental institutions that could be considered their specifically "political" traits: their internal authority relations.

The mere fact that this focus of inquiry was both still open and relatively unexplored was not, however, the only reason for choosing to explore it--although it obviously was a compelling reason. As soon as the possibility of linking political stability to characteristics of social authority was conceived, the voluminous literature dealing with the effects of family authority on political life suggested a way to stress the interplay between governmental and non-governmental patterns as itself an independent variable. The stability of democracies, and perhaps other polities, might be held to depend on the degree of resemblance between social and governmental authority patterns, in which case the crucial x-variable would be one involving both government and society simultaneously, not each separately--exactly what was required. Resemblances among social and political authority patterns clearly could also serve as a potential mediating and higher-order variable. For example, levels and rates of economic development (among other conditions) might affect political stability only, or chiefly, through their effects on the degree of resemblance among authority patterns; and a high level of economic development might correlate well (but imperfectly) with democracy's stability because it is (imperfectly) promoted by, or itself promotes, certain authority patterns in social life.

Two other considerations also entered into the decision to link political stability to resemblances among governmental and non-governmental authority patterns. First, the decision seemed intuitively plausible: if the social environment indeed closely affects political life, is it not likely to do so chiefly through those of its aspects that are most like political life itself? Second, a less intuitive measure of plausibility was given the decision by well-established social and psychological theories and promising new theoretical approaches in political study, including theories of learning and socialization, of strain, tension, and anomie, the theory of cognitive dissonance, and the political culture approach.¹¹ These promised, above all, to provide a foundation that social theories too often lack: a psychological basis for theory avoiding the pitfalls of psychological reductionism. They could provide that basis on one simple, and surely sensible, assumption: that men are able effectively to perform political roles if their previously learned norms and behavior substantially prepare them for such roles, and if the norms and practices demanded by their concurrent social roles do not create sharp strains or painful ambivalences and contradictions with their political ones.

The Monograph on Stable Democracy. The first product of this line of thought was a monograph published in 1961.¹² Its primary purpose was to probe reactions to the idea while it was still embryonic. In addition to stating, in a rather different and more complex way than has been done here, the hypothesis that the stability of democracies varies with the degree of resemblance among governmental and non-governmental authority patterns, the monograph argued that this relationship probably holds for other types of government as well, and that a special type of political structure promotes the resemblance of political to social authority relations in democracies. Three kinds of support for the hypotheses were invoked: (1) materials pertaining to an extremely stable case (Britain) and an egregiously unstable one (Weimar Germany); (2) the theories of behavior previously mentioned; and (3) the fact that the hypotheses could explain both the strengths and weaknesses of three other, relatively satisfactory, hypotheses about democracy's stability--those in which religion, economic development, and "mass society" were the x-variables.

The principal criticism made of the monograph--that its propositions were "obvious" and not unprecedented--was, if anything, encouraging; presumably they had not been so obvious to political scientists before being stated and no claim to utter novelty

had been made. The most telling criticism was that the arguments of the monograph, while supported with examples and reasoning, were still untested, and stated in a form not quite appropriate to rigorous theories, even those of the "middle range."

Three "Plausibility Probes." Although appropriately testing the propositions was the obvious next step to take, it was decided, for several reasons, not to do so immediately. For one thing, it is nearly always advisable to let promising young theoretical notions mature slowly before taking them seriously--to consider possible alternatives, to tinker with them by reflection, to consider them afresh, and with personal detachment, after applying oneself to other matters. More important, there is, unfortunately, no close relationship between the simplicity of propositions and the ease or economy of testing them; in this case, in fact, the effort required was bound to be very costly. The propositions themselves had to be more precisely and rigorously formulated. Virtually all the data required to test them had to be produced by original and extensive fieldwork in a large number of societies, plus the laborious collection and evaluation of pertinent observations varying greatly in reliability and buried in a massive number of studies primarily devoted to other concerns. One could certainly not base cross-national research into authority patterns on conveniently available statistical annuals and the like. This in turn called for resources--time, language skills, historical and cultural knowledge--that a single scholar never himself commands. Consequently, it would be necessary to involve others in the work, an effort likely to fail, or to be unfair, while ideas are still little more than passably plausible. Furthermore, testing the propositions would not be possible without developing an elaborate scheme of concepts for getting at the multifarious facets of authority relations: concepts unambiguously defined, standardized to apply to interactions in virtually all kinds of social units, and operationalized to make field observations reliable and some sort of measurement of resemblances among authority patterns possible. For this purpose, concepts already used to describe authority hardly sufficed, since they were mainly designed to characterize governments alone and rarely went beyond crude and gross distinctions (e.g. that between liberal and authoritarian relations). To relate the x-variable to political stability, it was necessary also to develop a set of categories and techniques for reliably determining different degrees of stability--a concept that, from the outset, was not

meant to apply only to the durability of governments over time but also to their "performance" while in being (hence to a variety of traits we now deem better expressed by the term "performance" itself.) Here again, the existing literature offered little but more or less well-informed impressions and crude distinctions.

In short, testing the propositions called for large resources, the confident collaboration of others, and a massive research design that would itself severely tax time and ingenuity. This being the case, it was almost mandatory to inquire further into the plausibility of the propositions before incurring the costs of large-scale, systematic research into them.

The additional "plausibility probes" undertaken because of these considerations involved three studies. (1) An attempt was made to determine, on the basis of secondary sources, whether certain social authority relations in the Bonn Federal Republic had changed, or were changing, in a direction predictable through the propositions stated in the monograph. The results, although not absolutely clear-cut, were certainly encouraging, and ambivalent largely because of the imperfections of the secondary sources themselves.

(2) Secondary sources were also used to investigate the plausibility of the propositions in the case of France (about which, at the time, I knew considerably less than about Britain and Germany, so that the formulation of the propositions was less likely to have been influenced by prior knowledge of the society). While in the case of Germany the essential problem was to determine whether the resemblance of political and other authority patterns had increased since the time of Weimar, the main problem in regard to France was whether one could find different social authority patterns to match the oscillating--indeed, in functional branches, concurrent--liberal and autocratic authority patterns of French governments. Did the often-positied competing French political "traditions" both have bases in the authority relations of different segments of society? Again the results were encouraging, even if not absolutely plain.

(3) An attempt was then made to try out the propositions in a context almost totally unfamiliar to me. Norway was chosen as the case, for a number of scholarly (and personal) reasons. The results of that attempt were even more reassuring than those of the previous probes--and, unlike the others, were published in a book¹³ not

initially meant to be written, partly because the case turned out to be unexpectedly fascinating, partly because of the general meagerness of materials in English on the smaller European democracies. The following major findings seemed strongly indicated by the study: (a) Norway was a case of very high political performance, on a considerable number of dimensions. (b) The great majority of existing propositions purporting to account for the high performance of democracies were almost uncannily impugned by the Norwegian case, not least a series of propositions about the kinds and degrees of political division consistent with great political cohesion. (c) While the high performance of Norwegian democracy could be related to other factors, a virtual isomorphism between political and social authority patterns turned up, as required by the propositions. (d) Special characteristics of Norwegian authority relations could be readily related to specific aspects of the Norwegian polity's performance: e. g. its extraordinary "legitimacy," its general "output efficiency," and its particularly great efficiency in producing certain kinds of output even under the auspices of minority cabinets governing strictly in accordance with normal parliamentary processes.

In the course of conducting these empirical probes, a number of other advances were also made. The propositions under investigation themselves became more precise. At least the outline of an "analytic scheme" of operational concepts for characterizing authority relations was developed--using "analysis" in the literal sense of dismembering complex phenomena of authority into their elementary constituent components (in a manner resembling somewhat the phonemes of structural linguistic or elements of the periodic table). This would permit, at least potentially, both the close description of and broad systematic comparisons among authority patterns in any social unit within any societal context. A similar set of ideas for specifying, at least crudely measuring, and comparing dimensions of political performance also started taking shape.

Outline of the Project

At this point it appeared reasonable to plunge into a more ambitious and elaborate project without more precautions. Two further considerations clinched the issue. At a minimum, a tightly defined group project on social authority patterns could yield materials which, as previously stated, many political scientists considered useful for

a variety of objectives, normative as well as value-neutral. Secondly, the present organization of teaching and research in comparative politics posed problems potentially remediable by the kind of team research the project clearly required; to the minimum benefit of obtaining large amounts of data on non-governmental authority patterns in many settings would be added the certain increment of experience with an organizational format for research (and graduate instruction) particularly devised for cross-national comparative study.¹⁴

A general research design for the comparative study of social authority patterns was now developed. In outline, this remains the design of the project, despite many specific modifications resulting from discussion and experience. The design includes the following:

1. An "analytic scheme" of concepts for describing authority patterns which specifies the dimensions on which the patterns vary and how they vary on the dimensions.
2. A set of research guides for each dimension of the scheme, specifying data sources that range from "cues" obtainable through raw observation to closed-ended questions for long and short interview and questionnaire schedules. (These guides resulted from discussions among the project's directors and members and from local pretesting. They must, of course, be adapted to specific cultures and social units by members of the project conducting fieldwork. The techniques used to obtain data also necessarily vary with the nature of field settings and, to a lesser extent, the methodological tastes and abilities of fieldworkers.)
3. A set of procedures for "scaling" data, to permit measurement of degrees of resemblance among authority relations.
4. The statement of components of the project's "dependent" (or y) variable, "political performance," and the specification of data-gathering and coding procedures relevant to them, potentially permitting their measurement in a manner similar to that of the "independent" variable, so that the relationship between the two sets of variables can

be determined with some precision. (The work of obtaining data on political performance is being done by research assistants, not by the fieldworkers; the latter already are kept more than busy by their studies of social authority patterns.)

5. Specification and explanation of the main, and some minor, hypotheses that the project as a whole seeks to investigate. (However, field researchers are free to define other theoretical goals, so long as the data they obtain are appropriate to the goals of the project.)

The Hypotheses: A Summary

The remainder of this paper covers the fifth aspect of this overall research design: the hypotheses that the project is intended to investigate. These are discussed in order of the importance we attach to them, the extent to which, even prior to concerted investigation, they are based on more than guesswork, and the extent to which thought has been devoted to stating them precisely and in a form conducive to systematic investigation. These three orders match one another because the importance attached to the hypotheses governs the other considerations. In very broad terms, they fall into two sets.

First and foremost, we are concerned with hypotheses relating authority patterns to the performance of social units, our principal "y-variable." In these, two major "x-variables" are used: congruence among authority patterns and consonance within them. The social units in which we are mainly interested are, of course, governments. However, the congruence hypotheses should also hold for other "inclusive" social units, i. e. units whose members are drawn from, and generally continue to belong to, a variety of other, usually smaller-scale, social units; and the consonance hypotheses should hold for any social unit whatever.

The second set of hypotheses concerns the adaptation of overall authority patterns, and of their specific dimensions, to one another. In essence, these hypotheses state propositions about the tendencies of authority relations to change when marked incongruence among them or dissonance within them exists. They

postulate, first, a tendency toward greater congruence or consonance if these are low. Secondly, they are concerned with the direction in which adaptation is likely to occur--for if marked incongruence among, or dissonance within, authority patterns begets adaptive change in them, the question of what is more or less likely to change in the process of adaptation obviously arises. Third, they deal with the conditions that prevent successful adaptation among and within authority patterns--for if one only asserts a "tendency" toward adaptive change in dissonant and incongruent patterns questions arise about the conditions under which the probable will in fact not happen or is especially likely to occur.

II. Congruence

Hypothesis 1: If the performance of a government (or other inclusive social unit) is high over an extensive period of time, its authority pattern will be congruent with the authority patterns of other social units.

This hypothesis originally inspired the project and remains its primary concern. To it, consequently, most thought has been, and most work will be, devoted. The first four facets of the project's research design, outlined above, have been devised primarily for the sake of investigating it deeply and systematically. In consequence, it will also be discussed here at greater length and in more detail than the other propositions.

Relationship Between the Variables

It should be noted that the hypothesis states a necessary relationship between its x-variable (congruence of authority patterns) and y-variable (continuously high performance by governments). This means nothing less than that a single contrary case suffices to falsify the proposition. Stating hypotheses in so uncompromising a form may certainly lead one to discard generalizations sufficiently probable to be of considerable use or more powerful than others available; nevertheless, it is advisable, indeed necessary, to state hypothesis 1 in this manner, for both general and special reasons. It is advisable, first, because hypotheses specifying a necessary relationship between variables are suitable to particularly stringent and economical testing; second, because it seems inappropriate to state a centrally important generalization underlying major research in a form readily susceptible to hedging--more proper, in such a case, to state in advance the strongest reasonable relationship expected to be found; and third, because the hypothesis is alleged to be grounded on relevant and valid psychological theory, which makes the relation between its variables directly causal, not merely in some looser sense statistical. It is necessary, because the x-variable used in the hypothesis is intended to be a mediating and higher-order variable, in the senses previously discussed. This implies, logically, that the hypothesis must posit the strongest possible relationship among variables, i. e. one falsifiable by a single case; it implies,

pragmatically, that the hypothesis should at least state a relationship between its variables stronger than any posited in other relevant hypotheses already stated. Should the investigation of the hypothesis in fact turn up a strong but not literally necessary relationship among its variables, the opportunity remains to decide between its outright rejection or its retention as an imperfect generalization alongside others, perhaps useful mainly for its ability to channel thought toward still more powerful generalizations.

The hypothesis does not, however, posit that congruence is a sufficient condition for high governmental performance. Although high performance presupposes congruence, low performance can occur despite the existence of congruence; consequently, a sufficient relation between the variables--"if authority patterns are congruent, performance will be high"--is not expected to hold in all cases. Low governmental performance can occur despite congruence because of strictly exogenous factors, especially the impact of external societies, or because of limitations and pressures arising from the endogenous setting (e.g. economic crises, problems of scale, etc.). The presence or absence of such factors has sometimes been held to cause high governmental performance directly. However, they seem to me more sensibly regarded as conditions that may prevent or lessen high performance despite the presence of conditions favorable to it, or that (less likely) may indirectly promote the existence of the favorable conditions.¹⁵ Despite this, we hold that the effects of exogenous or endogenous environmental difficulties on governmental performance can be mitigated to a considerable extent by congruence itself, so that it is highly likely, even if not strictly necessary, that low performance will be associated with low congruence.

Since hypothesis 1 states a necessary relationship, and since congruence is held to reduce the probability that low performance will be caused by other factors, one should expect a strong linear relationship between its variables. This means that the proposition "governments perform well to the extent that their authority patterns are congruent with those of other social units" (or "the greater is congruence, the higher is performance") should at least approximate reality. We certainly wish to determine whether this is the case. The necessary relationship posited between congruence and governmental performance in hypothesis 1 applies when the latter is above a specified threshold (i.e. dichotomized); in that case, congruence above a similarly specified

threshold is expected in all cases. But we also posit a somewhat weaker, yet still strong, relationship between levels of performance and degrees of congruence when they are ranked on continuous scales.

Hypothesis 1 and its intended implications can thus be better stated in three related propositions:

- Hypothesis 1.1 If governmental performance is above a specified threshold over an extensive period of time, congruence between governmental and social authority patterns must also be above a specified threshold.
- Hypothesis 1.2 If governmental performance is below the threshold specified in 1.1, congruence is likely to be below the specified threshold as well.
- Hypothesis 1.3 There is a strong linear relationship between levels of governmental performance and degrees of congruence among governmental and non-governmental authority patterns.

Discussion of Terms

The terminology used in hypotheses 1.1 - 1.3 needs to be clarified. The nature of "inclusive" social units has already been defined,¹⁶ and is, in any case, not a crucial matter, since our main concern is with governments in the conventional sense. We should, however, clarify three other notions: that of an extensive period of time, that of high and low governmental performance, and, most crucial of all, that of congruence among authority patterns.

Performance. Our notion of governmental performance has been worked out in considerable detail, and will be elaborated in a separate paper. There we will also spell out techniques for measuring its level and some results obtained by applying these techniques to countries being studied in the project. Here a cursory discussion must suffice.

Although the notion of performance necessarily implies evaluation of some sort, we do not imply by it any specific substantive governmental output--that is, the successful promotion by government of any specific social goal--but rather a set of dimensions on which a high rank appears necessary if any government is to be regarded as successful,

regardless of its concrete purposes (or even in the sense of its ability to achieve any substantive goals whatever). These include: durability (the persistence of governmental structures over time without major change); legitimacy (the ability of governments to command positive commitments in a society); strife-avoidance (the ability of governments to minimize civil violence, and related phenomena, directed at the structure of rule); output efficiency (the ability to arrive at directives pertinent to demands in a polity, especially intense and widespread ones, and to obtrusive environmental pressures on it); and permeation (the ability of a polity to derive resources from, and carry out its directives in, the various segments of its social space).

A government that performs well in these senses clearly need not be a "good" government. Whether one so regards it depends on the moral qualities discerned in it; indeed, "bad" governments that perform well should be perceived as the most intolerable of all. However, in the case of governments of a particular type, one may conceivably require to be present some special additional traits in order to feel comfortable with talk about their high performance. In ostensible democracies, for example, one may require not only a demonstrated capacity for enduring, commanding legitimacy, avoiding strife, arriving at pertinent directives, and permeating social space, but also that these things be accomplished without wide deviation from certain criteria of what it means to be democratic. For this, perhaps more questionable, aspect of performance we use a label, authenticity, that refers, broadly, to the correspondence between the actual practices of governments and what Mosca called the "political formulas" of societies. It follows that the notion of authenticity can really be made precise only in relation to specific types of rule, not in general terms.

While we think that a strong case can be made for this conception of governmental performance, hypotheses 1.1 - 1.3 are not inherently tied to it. They should hold for any other reasonable conception of performance, different from or overlapping with ours: for example, the SSRC Comparative Politics Committee's conception of six "problem areas," likely to generate political "crises" in various developmental sequences, action in which defines the "capacity" of polities.¹⁷ But this does not apply to conceptions that equate performance with specific value-preferences and thus automatically imply low performance on the part of governments having a special form or pursuing (successfully) other values.

Specifying a threshold--a point or range on a scale--above which governmental performance may be considered "high," and below which it is "low," is, initially at least, bound to be arbitrary. Provisionally, we plan to rank polities on 5-point scales in regard to each performance dimension, to average the results (expecting, incidentally, a strong correlation among the separate scores), and to locate the threshold at, or just around, the mid-point of the scale. This applies a simple common-sense notion of highness and lowness. Research itself, however, may reveal, even before any final testing, a somewhat different threshold at which hypothesis 1.1 should hold. This can be substituted for the mid-point threshold, provided two conditions are observed: (1) the threshold should not be substantially below the mid-point of the scale; if it were, congruence would be associated with far too wide a range of performance, leaving unsettled the question of what makes for the difference between very high and rather low rank. (2) A substantial number of cases must remain above the threshold. If they do not, the hypothesis might be held valid because--at the most extreme--it holds for the one case of highest performance found, even if for no other. In that case also the threshold might be so high that a very large range of variation in performance would still be associated with either congruence or incongruence, again leaving obscure much of what we hope to clarify. Most probably, therefore, the threshold, while adjustable in light of research, will fall between the third and fourth ranks of a five-point scale. (Mutatis mutandis, this applies to the threshold between high and low congruence as well.)

Extensive Time. Why the hypothesis should hold only for performance over an extensive period of time needs little explanation. The performance of a polity can obviously not be measured at any narrow moment in time--say, in a single year. This goes without saying for durability, but applies also to the other performance dimensions. Not using an extensive time period, one might be evaluating strife avoidance in a polity during some fleeting historical interlude when its members are in fact quiescent--perhaps only because they are regrouping forces for renewed civil strife or are for a time exhausted from the previous round's fighting. Or one might be gauging a polity's output efficiency at a special time when no directives responsive to demands or pressures are arrived at--perhaps only because they are in process of being worked out. The performance characteristics of polities all involve dynamic processes, not static attributes;

hence they are not adequately represented by conditions obtaining during mere historic moments.

The question, of course, is how long a time period is long enough for our purposes. The simplest answer is: the longer the better. But this is not really to the point, which concerns rather the minimum period of time required for ranking a polity's performance. The convention we have adopted for this purpose is that about half a generation should be regarded as the lowest possible limit. Among the reasons for this rule are the following: (a) Even the most short-lived, and otherwise inefficient, regimes (e.g. the Weimar Republic, the Fourth French Republic), have managed to persist about that long. (b) So-called "charismatic leaders" can generally maintain their rule efficaciously for about the same period, even if they fail to build solid institutions or lasting impersonal agreements in the polity. (c) Even highly efficacious polities can be immobilized for such a period by ephemeral conditions (e.g. the effects on a party system of the simultaneous decline of one major party and rise of another in its place). To say that less than half a generation hardly suffices to judge with some assurance the qualities of a government also seems "common sense."

Congruence. There remains to be explained the concept of "congruence" among governmental and social authority patterns. Clarifying that concept necessitates a lengthy discussion, partly because it is absolutely crucial to the hypotheses, partly because we use it (as have others) in a manner only vaguely indicated by accustomed words like resemblance or similarity, and partly because its meaning in the project diverges somewhat from other technical meanings that have been attached to it. (Despite this, we deem it an appropriate label for what we mean, although, needless to say, no major importance ever attaches to labels as such.)

The notion of congruence has had special and precise technical meanings in geometry and the theory of numbers, anyway since about mid-eighteenth century. These technical meanings make it a dichotomous variable: figures either can or cannot be exactly superimposed and quantities stated in the form of an equation either are or are not equal. The mathematical usage, however, is derived from a much earlier, still more or less common and rather less exact, set of usages: congruence as the condition of corresponding to something, agreeing with it in character, being in harmony with it,

following a paradigm, or being fit for a condition (as a man may be fit for the reception of divine grace). The notion of congruence in mathematics is, in effect, a sharpened version, adapted to a specific technical purpose, of a conventional concept denoting the agreement or mutual fitness of qualities. Such adaptations of the conventional concept exist outside of mathematics too, not least in the social sciences. These are not, and are not intended to be, exact equivalents of mathematical usage; above all, since in social science one generally talks about concrete phenomena, not abstract postulates, absolute correspondence is rarely implied by the term, and it is often used as a continuous rather than dichotomous variable. In all cases, however, including the present one, the concept is employed to denote some special and more exact technical version of the vague conventional notions of agreement or suitability, mathematics (and before it theology) having set the precedent.¹⁸

As we use the concept, congruence can be employed as either a dichotomous or continuous variable, depending on what is required by the nature of the hypotheses in which the term is used. Two social units may be said to have congruent authority patterns to the extent that they have similar characteristics on the dimensions of authority summarized at the beginning of the paper.¹⁹ Or--using the concept dichotomously--their authority patterns may be said to be congruent if their characteristics on these dimensions are the same or similar within specified limits, i.e. above a reasonable threshold of similarity. (This presupposes, of course, adequate definitions, operational guidelines, and scaling procedures for each dimension.) The minimum threshold reasonable for the purpose clearly is the distance on a scale less than that between its mid-point and extremes: e.g. a rank-difference of less than two on a five-point scale, less than three on a seven-point scale, and so on. A more generous threshold would imply that a unit could be simultaneously congruent with other units that fall on opposite extremes of a scale, which would make the concept absurd.

Figure 1
Congruence Between Two Units

<u>Position on Scale</u>	<u>A and B congruent</u>	<u>A and B congruent</u>	<u>A and B congruent</u>	<u>A more congruent with B than C or D</u>
5	A, B	A	A	A
4		B		
3			B	B
2				C
1				D

This is simple, but leaves important problems. We have answers to some of these that appear at least reasonable, while others we can deal with only tentatively at this stage of the work. Three especially need discussion. ²⁰

(1) Congruence Among Many Dimensions. Working with multidimensional phenomena obviously entails the possibility of divergent findings in regard to the different dimensions. "Systemic" relations among the dimensions may obviate that possibility, but we do not postulate such relations among the dimensions of authority (anyway, not yet). We may, therefore, find congruence on some dimensions and incongruence on others, indeed obtain spectacularly divergent findings, ranging from isomorphism to absolute contradiction in the same units. How then deal with overall congruence between two authority patterns?

Straightforward averaging--totalling rank differences and dividing by the number of dimensions--is the simplest way, and seems defensible as a rule-of-thumb. In most cases we will use it. However, there are two alternatives that also recommend themselves under certain conditions.

One is to weight incongruence on some dimensions more than others in arriving at an average. If we knew, or had strong reason to suspect, that certain aspects of authority are especially likely to set in motion the psychological tendencies (perceptions of dissonance, strain, tension, anomie or incapacity through learning to act out the

expectations attaching to political roles) that underlie congruence theory, weighting would not be difficult; but we do not know this, and the significance of the dimensions may vary from one culture to another. However, even if particular dimensions can not be weighted, degrees of incongruence on any of them can be. It seems reasonable to suppose that very marked incongruence on any authority dimension will have inimical consequences that are not of necessity proportionately reduced by congruence on others-- that is, sharp dissimilarity between two units on some dimensions of authority will create difficulties for those involved in both not significantly lessened by the experience of similarity in regard to others. (In fact, the very perception of dissonance that might result from such divergent experiences could itself exacerbate the difficulties.) Consequently, we propose in an alternative measure of congruence to magnify large dimensional dissimilarities by adding increments to any average incongruence score that results from "major" rank discrepancies on a limited number of dimensions, i. e. discrepancies greater than two on a 5-point scale, or equivalent rank differences on other scales. (A rough procedure for doing so is to add to the simple average score a percentage increment arrived at by subtracting $\frac{100}{n}$ from 100 for each "major" rank discrepancy found--n being the number of dimensions used. Figure 2 illustrates the effect of that procedure in a simple case.) However, since this entails assumptions little less doubtful than those entailed in simple averaging, it seems better provisionally to use both scores rather than either alone. An "adjusted average" procedure, in any case, must at this point be a makeshift serving mainly to reduce--not to eliminate entirely--the possibility that valid hypotheses might be falsified by measurements based on untenable assumptions. More exact knowledge of the general differences made by the experience of minor and major discrepancies in interactions requires separate large-scale research; more exact knowledge of their differential effects specifically on governmental performance requires that we know already what the project is intended to find out: the relation between such performance and incongruence.

Figure 2

Incongruence of Two Social Units
(5-point scales; 5 dimensions)

<u>Rank Differences</u> <u>on Dimensions</u>	<u>Incongruence Score</u> (simple average, to nearest .5)	<u>Incongruence Score</u> (adjusted average, to nearest .5)
<u>A</u> <u>B</u> <u>C</u> <u>D</u> <u>E</u>		
0 0 0 0 0	0	-
0 0 0 0 2	0.5	-
0 0 0 0 4	1.0	$1.0 + (1 \times .8) = 2.0$
0 0 0 4 4	1.5	$1.5 + (1.5 \times .6) = 2.5$
0 0 4 4 4	2.5	$2.5 + (2.5 \times .4) = 3.5$
0 4 4 4 4	3.0	$3.0 + (3.0 \times .2) = 3.5$
4 4 4 4 4	4.0	4.0

Note: Maximum incongruence is 4.0, which begins to be closely approached in the adjusted average when rank discrepancy is maximal on only three of the five dimensions.

Using adjusted averages places special emphasis on any dimension of authority that yields a "major" discrepancy between two units, regardless of what it is. The second possible alternative to simple averaging is to emphasize in advance particular dimensions of authority, regardless of, or together with, the rank-differences found on them. Although we cannot do this for performance in general, it is feasible for particular aspects of performance: special dimensions of authority can be expected to affect particularly strongly special dimensions of performance. Which dimensions of the former are particularly closely tied to special dimensions of the latter is a question on which our ideas are still tentative. Research itself should provide clues. But it seems manifest that the S-s dimensions will particularly affect the legitimacy and strife-avoidance aspects of performance (as will, of course, the legitimacy dimension itself),²¹ and that the S-S dimensions will be especially related to output efficiency. Hypotheses 1.1 - 1.3 can thus be elaborated by a series of further hypotheses, worded

similarly, except for the substitution of special aspects of performance and authority for the general concepts. (E.g.: "If governmental legitimacy is above a specified threshold over an extensive time period, the congruence of S-s relations in governments and other social units must also be above a specified threshold.") Some of these additional hypotheses, being less or not at all susceptible to exogenous factors, can indeed state sufficient as well as necessary relations, or posit strict linear relationships.

(2) Congruence Among Many Units. A second major problem stems from the fact that the discussion of congruence to this point has assumed two social units only. Hypotheses 1.1 - 1.3, however, refer to many of them: governments on one hand, and the various other segmental units of a society on the other. How determine degrees of congruence where numerous units are involved?

Two broad possibilities for doing so exist. One may be called absolute congruence: the degree of resemblance among all social units--i.e. of all possible dyads of such units--arrived at by simple or more complex calculations similar to those discussed in regard to the dimensions of authority. The other is relative congruence: the resemblance of a limited number of dyads, regardless of what is the case for the others.

When the possibility of using the congruence variable to formulate better theory about governmental performance was first entertained, it was in the form of absolute congruence. No particular social authority patterns were marked for emphasis. But the untenability of this position soon became apparent. Even in the most durable, legitimate, and effective democracies, rather undemocratic authority relations were readily found, most often in special and narrow segments of society (e.g. the military) but at least sometimes in highly pervasive ones (e.g. families or schools). It also seemed obvious that there were inherent limits (functional or otherwise) on the extent to which certain social relations could be conducted on a democratic or any other model of authority. A considerable asymmetry of influence is probably inherent in institutions that include children and adults. "Fighting organizations" (those engaged in constant competition for severely limited benefits, like sports teams or firms in free market economies) may, as Michels argued, be compelled to follow undemocratic organizational imperatives. Inherent differences in "conformation" may result from such ineluctable

differences in social units as their size (a nuclear family, for example, simply cannot be as "stratiform" --have as many levels of authority--as a national government). Absolute congruence, even in a sense short of isomorphism, thus does not and cannot occur in the great majority of cases, except within narrow limits, and is least likely to occur, or to be most restricted, in complex, large-scale societies--precisely those in which the project's concerns originated.

The notion of "relative congruence" offers a tenable way out of this difficulty. It rests fundamentally on the supposition that some social relationships affect government much less than others. In all societies, for example, political parties surely have a closer bearing on government than sports teams; in a particular society, like Great Britain, public and grammar schools manifestly affect more immediately the governmental apparatus than secondary modern schools. Hence, congruence theory might work well enough if the concept of congruence were taken in a relative sense: the resemblance of the governmental authority pattern to specified other patterns in a society, but not to all. It is in this sense that it is in fact used in hypotheses 1.1 - 1.3.

It is, of course, necessary to specify the pertinent social units in advance of research (otherwise findings can be rigged too easily), and it is desirable to specify them in a manner general enough to serve in all societies (similar social units might have varying significance, different ones the same significance, in different societies) and to apply to "inclusive" social units other than governments. For this purpose, we use the notion of the adjacency (or contiguity) of social units: we hold congruence to exist to the extent that adjacent units have similar authority patterns, regardless of the degree of incongruence between non-adjacent dyads.

In the project, we are chiefly concerned with the dyads formed by governments and their adjacent social units. However, using the idea of adjacency, one can speak of all the authority patterns of a society being congruent if no sharp incongruity exists between any contiguous dyads--which reduces, but does not preclude, the probability of great incongruity between non-adjacent social units. And since hypotheses 1.1 - 1.3 in their most general form imply that incongruity impairs the performance of any inclusive social units, not just governments, we expect to find that where governmental performance is very high, congruence will be considerable even between governmental

and many "non-adjacent" social authority patterns, or that there will be found a pattern of increasing congruence with the governmental pattern as social units become less "distant" from government. In the monograph of 1961, this notion of increasing congruence among increasingly proximate units was expressed by the term "graduated resemblances." Among other things, the notion implies that in highly effective democracies large traces of democratic structure should appear even in such apparently "remote" interactions as, let us say, child-rearing, the organization of sports teams, or, going very far afield, prison administration, even if this begets avoidable difficulties in these patterns.

By what standards then is the adjacency of social units determined? We use four criteria for this purpose, arrived at by reflection on what is likely to trigger or heighten the perception of anomalies. In descending importance they are:

(1) Adjacency varies with the frequency of direct boundary-exchange among social units, i. e. the extent to which one serves as a special unit of recruitment for another, especially for its higher S-positions and when those recruited from one unit into another remain members of both. In democracies, political parties almost invariably are such special recruitment units for the chief governmental decision-making positions, and governmental leaders generally serve simultaneously as party leaders as well. In particular democracies other types of social units may occupy, even if only latently, a similar position: e. g. the public schools (especially the nine "Clarendon schools") throughout much of modern British history, or communal authorities in Norway (which are a considerably more important recruitment area for national offices in that country than "local governments" are normally). The word "direct" is of some importance here. It distinguishes special units of recruitment for governmental positions, like political parties, from those, like families, out of which political incumbents inevitably are in fact recruited but that do not have, manifestly or latently, any special function of providing such incumbents. (Those "political families" which, in the manner of certain British aristocratic families in the age of oligarchy, are dedicated to producing rulers are, of course, exceptions.)²²

(2) Adjacency varies with the significance of a social unit for socialization into another, or for learning the norms and practices entailed in its roles. In our project,

the social units most adjacent to government in these terms are, of course, those most instrumental in political socialization and learning. The assumption that these are somewhat less important than boundary-exchange units may be questionable; however, they are assigned a very considerable significance, are being investigated in virtually all the field studies, and, in any case, greatly overlap (at least in the case of secondary and tertiary socialization) with the first set of units.

(3) Adjacency varies with the frequency and importance of cross-boundary interaction between members of different social units. Such interaction exists whenever men interact in their separate capacities as members of the different units, and may be considered especially important when the interactions directly concern the formulation and manner of execution of directives by the more inclusive unit, most of all when this is done by joint bodies or requires collaborative relationships. In modern democracies, for example, a great amount of such interaction invariably occurs among governments and pressure groups. Much of it is informal, but a considerable amount takes place through formal joint committees (the British TUC has formal representation on nearly one hundred such committees) or through arrangements so regular and continuous as to constitute "institutions," even if not "organizations." Much of such interaction also is clearly essential to the devising of sensible and administrable directives; for instance public medical policies can hardly be formulated without the sort of technical knowledge that medical associations especially possess, or be effectively carried out without the profession's collaboration.

(4) Adjacency varies with the strength of de facto role segregation between social units, i. e. the extent to which actors can shift from roles in one into those in others without experiencing sharp contradictions, even where such contradictions "objectively" appear to exist. We know that men do not always experience "objective" strains or other incongruities among their roles (i. e. strains apparent to an external observer), and that they can sometimes handle strains effectively even if they are perceived. Doctors, for example, respond to the opposite sex differently as physicians and as husbands or lovers, at least in the main. They do so because these roles are strictly segregated (hence the sociological talk about "actors" rather than people) and because the idea of their segregation is deeply implanted in practitioners in many ways,

medical codes of ethics being only the most superficial. The likelihood that roles in different units will be effectively segregated depends on the roles themselves and many contingent circumstances, and it is quite possible that the same roles will be strongly and weakly segregated in different societies. But if such segregation does exist, whatever the reasons, the effects of incongruence between units should certainly be mitigated.

We make this the least important criterion of adjacency for two reasons. "Managing" strains may be expected to entail psychic costs in itself, especially where roles are highly contiguous in other senses and incongruence among them is very great. Equally important, the idea of role segregation offers perhaps too tempting a way of explaining conveniently away any incongruence not actually associated with the effects postulated for it. For these reasons, in fact, little, if any, use will be made of the fourth criterion of adjacency in our present work. Additional reasons for this are that the idea of role segregation remains operationally vague in sociology and that the first and second criteria of adjacency already yield more social units highly relevant to our research than our resources permit us to cover.

What particular social units are highly adjacent to governments in any society cannot be stated in advance; it depends. In one case, the family will be a crucial unit of political socialization, in others not--and so on. Ideally, large-scale research, based on elaborately specified operations, should be undertaken to discover the more or less adjacent social units in every case studied. In practice, however, we do not intend to undertake such research at this stage, but will rely instead on the "feel" for their societies of those doing fieldwork. The main reason again involves resources. We realize that this entails a risk. But it is an unavoidable risk, diminished by the facts that directly relevant studies (e. g. on political elite recruitment) already are available in many cases and that the social units most contiguous to government usually are manifest to knowledgeable researchers, if they know what general criteria to employ in judging the matter. (The majority of social units in fact being studied are political parties and institutions of secondary and higher education, especially "elite" institutions. It would be astonishing if any of these were not "contiguous" to government.)

(3) Synchronic, Diachronic, and Dynamic Congruence. Among less basic problems posed by the idea and measurement of congruence (most of which arose only in the process of designing particular field studies) one particularly deserves mention, for it has given rise to a conception of congruence different, in certain respects, from those mentioned so far. We do not presently intend to put that conception systematically to work, but it may play a role in some case studies and in future research, and might be essential to any definitive testing of congruence theory, as well as any full understanding of the conception of congruence itself. It involves a distinction between synchronic, diachronic, and dynamic congruence.

The distinction arises from a rather obvious problem. Suppose a field study finds considerable congruence or incongruence between a country's governmental authority pattern and those of its secondary schools. What can be made of that finding? Relating it to governmental performance via the congruence hypotheses obviously begs a question: whether authority relations in the schools were similar when the political superordinates and other older citizens were pupils. Obviously they may not have been. Hence a finding of synchronically high congruence and high performance need not support the congruence hypotheses, and will in fact be contrary to them if authority relations in the schools were quite different when the older generation was young. This problem necessarily arises when different generations, or even cohorts, are studied at the same point in time, and is almost inescapable in our project for two reasons. Schools (and other youthful contexts) generally are highly significant in political socialization, and some of them are equally significant in political elite recruitment. And while we are concerned with performance over an "extensive period of time," fieldwork is necessarily restricted to a narrow time period, creating unavoidable asymmetry in the time periods during which we study our x and y-variables.

The problem is not insoluble. To be sure, one can hardly study phenomena in the past, especially the remote past, with the same techniques, or as closely, as those in the present. But if the time discrepancies are small an assumption of little change, on the evidence, generally can be safely made. If they are not minor, then, among other sources, the recollections of older respondents, secondary studies, or documentary records usually can sufficiently indicate whether major changes have occurred.

At worst, even if present studies of such cases must be tinged with a measure of uncertainty, future studies, using the fruits of present research when they are more unquestionably pertinent, can be conducted--if anyone still is interested. Where a generation gap exists among units related to one another, the implications of research may be more uncertain and research itself may have to be less than ideally systematic, but the idea of congruence as expounded here itself needs no revision; in such a case one simply assesses the congruence between units at different points in time, or extrapolates the past from the present if no strong reason for not doing so exists. "Diachronic" congruence is simply the degree of congruence (as already defined) among social units at different points in time, appropriately selected.

However, we are considering, and see some merit in, a rather different way of using the congruence concept over time. It might not be senseless to speak of congruence among two social units at different points in time, even if one is quite dissimilar at some pertinent past time (x) from the other at a later time ($x + n$), if three conditions obtain: (1) if the direction of change in one unit has been continuously toward greater resemblance to the other--e.g. toward continuously greater participation by subs or permissiveness by supers; (2) if the rate of change has also been continuous, i.e. devoid of sudden jumps or discontinuities in the pattern of development toward greater congruence; and (3) if the changes involve an increasing practical realization of norms already widely held (or at least, if changes in norms occur before changes in actual practices).²³ Such a process might be called "dynamic congruence"--assuming that the concept makes sense in such a form at all.

The notion of dynamic congruence is predicated on the supposition that changes having the characteristics described mitigate the negative consequences otherwise expected to ensue from diachronic incongruence. Many reasons for this supposition can be given. For example, where such a pattern is found, no sharp differences will exist among near-contemporaries in a social unit. Those socialized and recruited into a social unit at an early point are likely to be phased out, or otherwise reduced in number or importance, as those socialized and recruited much later enter and rise within it. Assuming greater contact among, and openness to learning from, near-contemporaries, each new cohort is in such a case likely to modify the learned expectations of previous ones, with the result that early cohorts in the unit will already have acquired greatly

modified "cognitive maps" when much later ones enter. Not least, where the third condition obtains, accustomed norms will already exist to support unaccustomed practices.

In effect, the notion of dynamic congruence applies that of graduated resemblances, "not to units more or less contiguous at a single point in time, but to contiguous periods in their development. It also squares congruence theory with the long-established, empirically supportable, but generally more vaguely held belief that gradual changes in a continuous direction impair the performance of societies less than sudden or erratic changes. This belief is often used normatively to support conservative positions, but a conservative stance is not inherent in it, for one can value changes in social relationships for their intrinsic worth at almost any cost in impaired performance, or opt for short-run deprivations in order to obtain greater long-run satisfactions. The argument that "bad" arrangements which work well should be perceived as particularly "immoral" applies here too.

III. Consonance

Hypothesis 2: If the performance of a social unit's authority pattern is high over an extensive time period, the elements of the pattern will be consonant.

Relationship Between the Variables

Hypothesis 2 posits relations between its variables similar in all major respects to those stated in hypothesis 1 and its elaborations, despite minor differences. It specifies a necessary relationship where the variables are used dichotomously through the specification of thresholds, although the reasons in this case are somewhat less compelling than in the case of the first hypothesis, at any rate at the same thresholds.²⁴ It does not hold consonance to be a sufficient condition for high performance, due to considerations similar to those mentioned in the discussion of hypothesis 1, plus an additional reason: the dysfunctional consequences for the performance of inclusive units expected to flow from incongruence, even if their authority patterns are highly consonant. The consonance hypothesis similarly provides an additional reason for holding that hypothesis 1 also cannot state a sufficient relation between its variables: congruence might exist among units that internally are highly dissonant. (In that sense, one could speak of "malign" congruence, although that notion is softened in hypothesis 5, below.) A strong, but imperfect, linear relation between the variables, used continuously, is posited as well (i.e. "the higher is performance, the greater will be consonance"). This relation, however, is expected to be somewhat weaker than that implied in hypothesis 1.3. The chief reason for its lesser strength will be discussed in detail later in this section; in essence, it involves the probability that certain kinds of moderate dissonance will actually be functional to the performance of particular kinds of social units, not least among them, for our purposes, democratic governments.

Hypothesis 2 can thus be elaborated, in a manner similar to hypothesis 1, in three propositions:

Hypothesis 2. 1: If the performance of a social unit is above a specified threshold over an extensive time period, the consonance of the elements of its authority pattern will also be above a specified threshold.

Hypothesis 2. 2: If performance is below the specified threshold, consonance is likely to be below the specified threshold as well.

Hypothesis 2. 3: There is a moderately strong linear relationship between levels of performance and degrees of consonance in the authority patterns of social units.

Background Considerations

The consonance hypothesis was added to congruence theory only after the decision to conduct a major inquiry into the relations among political and social authority patterns had been taken, and resulted from a more elaborate examination of the bases and implications of its chief guiding hypothesis than had previously been undertaken. Two major considerations led to its formulation. One was the belief, probably needing no justification, that the internal characteristics of a social unit's authority pattern must themselves affect the unit's performance. This had already been implied in the monograph of 1961, through the argument that different governmental patterns in democracies promote or impede congruence with social authority patterns. That argument left the internal characteristics of authority patterns entirely subsidiary to resemblances among them, holding only that they would in some cases increase or lessen the probability of congruence. However, it seemed equally plausible that the internal characteristics would impinge independently upon performance, especially in light of many studies, like those of industrial sociology, that have successfully related specific types of authority relations to performance in regard to specific goals. Some of the psychological and sociological bases of congruence theory pointed in the same direction. They also suggested a more general way of relating the internal characteristics of authority patterns to performance than is involved in positing that certain specific authority relations better promote certain specific organizational purposes (e. g. high productivity or low labor turnover) than others. A dysfunctional lack of fit, agreement, or harmony might exist not only among the overall authority patterns of social units, but, authority being multidimensional, among the component elements of individual authority patterns as well. Experiences on one dimension might jar against experiences on another; the norms or practices of some members of a unit might conflict with those of others; and in

such cases, consequences equivalent to those of incongruence in a broader sense could reasonably be expected to follow. The fit or harmony of the elements of authority patterns is what the notion of "consonance" is intended to denote.

The consonance hypothesis is presently less fully developed than hypotheses 1.1 - 1.3. We came to it later; we are still interested in it, mainly insofar as it limits and elaborates congruence theory itself; and the investigation of the project's chief guiding hypothesis alone demands most of the work we can do in the near future. Moreover, although the idea of consonance may be clear enough in a general sense, it is difficult to specify abstractly what characteristics of authority relations are consonant with what other characteristics--although we recognize that it is necessary to specify them if circularity in argument is to be prevented (i. e. the attribution of "dissonance" to the authority relations of any social unit that does not perform well). Consonance theory at this stage is approximately at the point where congruence theory was when first stated: a plausible idea resting on decent foundations, but not yet as elaborately or rigorously stated as it should be.

It should be noted that consonance theory, while directing attention to the internal structure of governments, makes no concessions to those who attribute the performance of democracies (or other types of polity) mainly to the mechanics of their construction. It does not at all imply that democracies are ipso facto likely to perform well if they use a particular kind of electoral system, or a special ordering of executive and legislative powers, and the like. It refers to the general harmonization of elements of authority patterns--not to particular institutional gadgets. This, however, does not rule out the possibility of increasing governmental performance by "constitutional engineering"; it implies only that such engineering is far more complicated than is commonly believed.

The Meaning of Consonance

In the most general sense, the elements of authority patterns--that is, their characteristics on the various dimensions of authority--are consonant to the extent that they are mutually reinforcing or supportive. This involves a continuum at the extremes of which the elements of authority relations mutually strengthen or corrode, support or oppose, one another, the midpoint being mere compatibility among them. (In the

language of Osgood's "semantic features" analysis, compatibility in this sense involves a merely "permissive" relationship among elements, one that only modifies in a reasonable way the significance of one dimension in a complex of dimensions, as opposite adjectives modify nouns. To give a simple example: "black" permissively modifies the word "man," "striped" does not.) Whether a set of elements falls on one point or another of this continuum will depend to a degree on perceptions governed by cultural idiosyncrasies; nevertheless, many combinations of elements will fall on limited ranges of the continuum, or above or below a specified threshold between consonance and dissonance, regardless of variations in culture, so that, within limits, abstract theory about the mutual fit of the elements of authority patterns can be developed.

The general notion of consonance comprehends four component notions, each more specific and informative than the general notion itself. The labels we use for these (again without attaching intrinsic value to them) are complementarity, correspondence, coherence, and consistency.

Complementarity refers to the matching of the supers' and subs' attitudes and behaviors, on the same or especially closely related dimensions. It exists when their attitudes or behaviors are similar on a single dimension: for example, when both perceive similar "distance" between subordinates and superordinates or expect that the same areas of activity in a unit will be covered to a similar extent by the supers' directives. It also exists, in a slightly different sense, when the attitudes or behavior of S and s on different dimensions dovetail with one another: e. g. when superordinates are highly unresponsive and subs highly non-participant, so that there is little for supers to respond to in the first place.

A famous example of complementarity in political authority is the long tendency, among British rulers, to expect "deference" and, among the ruled, to accord it. How such a matching of attitudes and behavior promotes high performance, or its lack impairs it, should be evident without discussion. In governments, of course, it is mainly the legitimacy and strife-avoidance aspects of performance that are likely to be affected by complementarity. Mutatis mutandis, this also applies to other social units (although our conception of performance certainly needs revision to be pertinent to other structures): if, for example, university students intensely value participation and permissiveness and administrators are highly unresponsive and "directive," campus unrest is hardly surprising.

Correspondence is a concept that can be clarified only after a preliminary remark about our use of the various dimensions of authority (which will be amplified in the separate paper on the project's "analytic scheme"). The characteristics of authority patterns on nearly all of the dimensions can be described from three points of view: the forms, norms, and practices pertinent to them. "Forms" are explicit prescriptions that members of a unit, whether supers or subs, conduct themselves in a certain manner in authority relations; they refer to what, in a broad sense, is understood by constitutional structure (not, of course, to written constitutions only). "Norms" are attitudes toward how supers and subs should ideally conduct themselves; they involve notions of propriety in the process of authority. "Practices" simply refer to the actual conduct of authority relations. A few of the dimensions we use are inherently concerned with norms or practices only, and some social units lack any forms pertinent to authority; in the majority of cases, however, all three will be found.

An authority pattern exhibits "correspondence" simply to the extent that norms, forms, and practices on the same dimensions match one another. Again, it should be readily apparent why such matching would generally raise, and a lack of it lower, performance levels. Granted that contrary cases can be imagined. A departure from the prescriptive forms of a unit has been known to enhance despatch in transacting business or to help achieve particular objectives efficiently. A strict adherence to norms has sometimes been self-defeating. Forms dissonant with practices but expressing strongly-held norms have been used effectively to enhance the legitimacy of rulers. But such cases are hardly the general rule. Most often they occur in extraordinary circumstances (e. g. crises requiring especially swift action) and tend to work only in the short run. For example, the use of dissonant forms as gimmicks for enhancing legitimacy may work for a time, but is likely to have exaggeratedly destructive effects in the end if, as is always likely, it comes to be recognized as mere flimflam.

Forms are obviously less important than norms and practices where, as often happens, they are understood to be unreal standards, full conformity to which is not expected or sometimes even desired. Where norms and practices do not correspond, however, even forms recognized not to mean much may sometimes reduce perceptions of dissonance by giving a special kind of concrete expression to the norms. This occurs

when the norms are acted out as formal rituals or ceremonies--highly visible "form-practices," so to speak, ornamenting less visible practices in the more literal sense. As ceremonies, formal arrangements can also enhance legitimacy by symbolizing group identifications, or simply by appealing to the esthetic sensibilities of simple minds--an effect that Bagehot ascribed to the manifold ceremonies of British political life. (No matter how pretty, however, rituals are unlikely to have these effects unless supported by corresponding norms. The dividing line between ceremony and burlesque is thin and tenuous.)

Coherence raises greater difficulties than the other meanings of consonance, in practice if not principle. In general terms, it exists to the extent that the elements of an authority pattern form integrated clusters. The characteristics of an authority pattern on any two dimensions form such a cluster if what is the case on one is entailed, logically or psychologically, by what is the case on the other. In the case of a multi-dimensional cluster, coherence, like congruence, can be used in an absolute sense, to denote coherence in all the dyads of the cluster, or in a relative sense, to denote coherence in dyads formed by dimensions that have an especially close bearing on one another. (For example, the four influence dimensions--participation, responsiveness, compliance, and permissiveness--will, in all probability, have a closer bearing on one another than on other dimensions of authority.)

The practical difficulties in using the concept of coherence arise, of course, when one tries to specify just what characteristics on any dimension of authority strengthen or corrode, are compatible or incompatible with, those on any other. We cannot specify integrated and unintegrated clusters here in any detail or with finality, for two reasons. The first, which is not serious, is that doing so presupposes detailed knowledge of the dimensions of authority patterns and how units vary on them--a subject not covered sufficiently in this paper. The second, more serious reason is that the specification of coherent and incoherent clusters is troublesome even with a full analytic scheme of authority elements in hand. Figure 3, however, at least illustrates the concept in concrete form, using a finding of great distance between supers and subs as a base and clustering it dyadically with several other dimensions, selected because their characteristics can be stated on the figure in language sufficiently self-explanatory for the present

purpose. The exercise it illustrates can be repeated using severally any and all of the dimensions as points of departure; but even using distance alone as a constant in the dyads permits the inference of other cases of dyadic, or more complex, coherence or incoherence. Figure 3, for example, implies that low participation and open recruitment are an incoherent dyad and that the complex cluster (great distance + obsequious s-behavior + low participation + low responsiveness + low proximity + closed recruitment is coherent.

Figure 3

Coherence

<u>Dimensions</u>	<u>Coherent with Great Distance</u>	<u>Incoherent with Great Distance</u>
Department (<u>S-s</u>)	Arrogant (<u>S</u>)-obsequious (<u>s</u>)	Familiar
Participation (<u>s</u>)	Low	High
Responsiveness (<u>S</u>)	Low	High
Proximity (<u>S-s</u>)	Low	High
Recruitment	Closed	Open

Difficulty of course is not impossibility. Through a combination of reflection on and empirical work with the elements of our analytic scheme, we hope in fact to arrive at a limited number of typical coherent clusters in authority relations, and that these may serve as a general typology of both "public" and "private" authority structures, better (because more systematically constructed and more widely applicable) than existing classifications of polities, and consisting of genuine "ideal types," the components of which actually are mutually entailed. These types should be useful for more than description and raising questions. Unlike Weber's, they should also be directly useful for purposes of theory, in that they would specify the nature of authority structures likely or, in various degrees, unlikely to possess durability, or to perform well otherwise. Most of the work toward this end remains to be done, but it has been started.

Consistency refers to the manner in which different attitudes and ways of acting are distributed in a social unit. It exists when attitudes and behaviors in a unit are uniform or clearly unimodal; it is absent when they are clearly multimodal, i. e. when two or more kinds of attitude or behavior are simultaneously characteristic of the unit. This may be considered especially perilous to performance when the modes widely diverge on the various dimensions and when the members who feel and act differently are clearly identifiable as special segments of the unit, on grounds additional to their differences on the authority dimensions (i. e. when differences on the dimensions cluster with special demographic, generational, functional, sexual, economic, racial or other such "categoric" characteristics, and thus constitute "cleavages," as that concept was used in my study of Norway).²⁵

A special kind of inconsistency arises when widely divergent attitudes on the same dimensions are held by the same individuals in a social unit--certainly one possible source of finding multimodal distributions on the dimensions. The possibility of such a finding had not occurred to us in the early planning of the project, and the probability of finding it had been reduced by the wording of many questionnaire and interview questions. However, in a few cases such findings, where not precluded by wording, have actually turned up in the course of pretesting interview schedules--chiefly, as might be expected, in societies that have recently experienced sharp discontinuities in political or other segments of social life. These are cases not of "anomie" but of "binomie." We suspect that they will occur with considerable frequency in a rapidly developing world, and that theories of their effects on both individuals and collectivities will prove essential to the understanding of that world.

Scaling a unit for overall consonance, encompassing all component meanings of the concept, poses no special problems. The matter can be handled in a manner similar to scaling congruence among units on all the authority dimensions. One can simply average a unit's ranks on all the consonance scales, or adjust the average to take into account great dissonance on a limited number of them, or do both; and one can similarly link particular kinds of consonance to particular aspects of performance, in a manner illustrated in the discussion of complementarity.

IV. Congruence and Consonance

Since the performance of governments (and other "inclusive" social units) is held to be affected by both congruence and consonance, a full system of hypotheses relating these variables should, ideally, relate the two x-variables to one another and both jointly to the y-variable. As stated, we intend to concentrate mainly on congruence theory; consequently, we have not attempted to elaborate such a complete system of propositions. However, we have ideas relevant to the enterprise on which the project's research should shed light. Hypotheses 3-7 state propositions embodying these ideas, some logically entailed by hypotheses 1 and 2, some plausible on other grounds or a combination of logical and other considerations.

- Hypothesis 3: Very high performance by governments (and other inclusive units) over extensive time requires both high congruence and high consonance.
- Hypothesis 4: If congruence and consonance both are low, performance will be very low.
- Hypothesis 5: Congruence tends to reduce the negative effect on performance of dissonance alone.
- Hypothesis 6: Incongruence tends to reduce the positive effect on performance of consonance alone.
- Hypothesis 7: In specific societies, specific kinds of dissonance in the governmental pattern increase the possibility of congruence and, through congruence, of high performance.

Hypotheses 3 and 4 are simply combinations of hypotheses 1 and 2 (or, more precisely, hypotheses 1.1 and 2.1), and must be valid if the latter are valid. Intuitively, one would particularly expect them to hold if performance is markedly above or below the thresholds of performance specified for purposes of investigating the first two hypotheses. This is one reason for using the terms "very high" and "very low" in hypotheses 3 and 4, but not the only reason. Another is that the effects of congruence and consonance, incongruence and dissonance, should mutually reinforce one another. Still another is that the relationships specified in the hypotheses need not hold where performance is very near the specified threshold, for reasons that will emerge in the course of discussing hypotheses 5 - 7.

Hypothesis 5 is not strictly logically entailed by any previous propositions. Although the assertion that congruence promotes high performance may be taken to imply that congruence will mitigate the negative effects of dissonance, one can as logically state the inverse--i.e. that dissonance will reduce the positive effects of congruence--since dissonance is posited to make for low performance. Actually, these two propositions are not mutually exclusive. Combining them could simply be taken to imply that congruent-dissonant and incongruent-consonant patterns will cluster around the midpoints of a performance scale. That implication, however, would imply a special need for locating the threshold required by hypotheses 1.1 at a rather high level, since the positive effects of consonance could raise the performance of some incongruent units well above midpoint of the scale. Eventually this may turn out to be necessary on empirical grounds, but it is better avoided in connection with the project's central hypothesis unless so compelled, for reasons previously discussed. The only way actually to avoid having to locate the threshold well above midpoint on purely logical grounds, however, is to posit that congruence is a more potent x-variable than consonance. This is in fact implied by hypotheses 5, 6, and 7.

The key reason for stating hypothesis 5 as it is stated here involves a conjecture about the ability of men to "manage," or even not consciously to perceive, strains and anomalies in their roles. Most sociologists and social psychologists who write about the matter, hold that role strains and anomalies may be dysfunctional, but also that they can be managed without dysfunctional effects. Unfortunately, they are evasive or altogether silent about the general conditions under which strains and anomalies are or are not likely to be managed, despite a large literature on mechanisms held impressionistically to serve this purpose in particular cases. Constructing general theory about tension-management is a task too vast and too remote from our specific concerns to justify an attempt to undertake it; however, hypothesis 5 points toward one general condition under which strains are likely to be "managed." It holds that if one has become accustomed to the dissonant anomalies of inclusive social units, like governments, through highly congruent experiences in other units, especially perhaps those involving early socialization and learning, one should be better able to tolerate and cope with the anomalies--regard them as "natural" or even fail to perceive their anomaly--than

without preparation for them. The fact that anomalies are very marked should of course inhibit successful internalization in the first place, but there is reason to think that a tolerance for anomaly can be learned and internalized like anything else, at least within not inconsiderable limits.

In itself, however, this does not imply that congruence is a more potent factor than consonance. By the same token, after all, it could be argued that if the elements of authority patterns reinforce one another, lack of experience with them in other units ought itself to count for less. In one case previous learning provides a prop; in the other a cement may be provided by the mutual strengthening resulting from complementarity, coherence, consistency, and correspondence. The reason for not arguing such a position is essential to understanding hypothesis 6. It is that consonance in incongruent patterns necessarily implies very considerable incongruence indeed, while the same does not hold for the relations between congruence and dissonance--i.e. the congruence of dissonant patterns does not necessarily imply a high degree of dissonance. If patterns are both incongruent and in themselves consonant, it follows that incongruence between them must exist on all, or nearly all, dimensions and positions on dimensions--in other words, that they must resemble one another very little. One can imagine cases in which intra-unit dissonance makes for greater congruence with other units through great resemblances on some dimensions, but if units are greatly dissimilar on any dimension and at the same time highly consonant they must also be greatly dissimilar on other dimensions. Per contra, if units do not greatly resemble one another on certain dimensions, it does not in the least follow that all their elements must be highly consonant; they may be, but they need not. Hence, the positive effects of consonance are more likely to be cancelled, and more than cancelled, by the negative effects of high incongruence than are losses from dissonance by entailed gains in congruence--one reason, among others, why hypothesis 2 was held to be less compelling, at the same thresholds, than hypothesis 1.

In this sense, one can speak sensibly of a kind of "malign consonance": a pattern of mutually reinforcing incongruities among the elements of different authority patterns. Its counterpart is "benign dissonance"; and this notion is central to hypothesis 7.

The notion of benign dissonance already played a role in the arguments of the monograph of 1961. There it entered through the idea of "balanced disparities"--an idea generally overlooked in critiques of the monograph, and probably not felicitously stated or discussed in its initial form. The argument of the monograph was that certain apparently dissonant mixes of elements in their authority structures may not only be undestructive but positively functional to governments. The argument was initially based on the specific supposition that purely democratic governmental problems are likely to be more incongruent with social authority patterns than impure ones, because of the extreme unlikelihood that highly democratic relations would exist in many social units due to functional imperatives--e.g. in families and schools, or in "fighting organizations," like political parties, that obviously are highly contiguous to government. Whether this argument, making the necessary modifications, can be extended beyond democratic governments remains problematic and is not crucial to our basic purposes in the project; but the argument can certainly be stated in a more general way potentially applicable to many other authority structures.

The most general way of stating it is to say: (1) that dissonance is, on balance, benign to the extent that it contributes to congruence; (2) that in societies differentiated into many functional segments which must satisfy different functional imperatives to perform well, a degree of mixture (dissonance) in the governmental pattern is necessary to avoid high incongruence--a modern, limited, and modified version of a very old theory, the Polybian theory of the superiority of "mixed governments"; and (3) that if the authority patterns of subsidiary social units themselves are in some degree dissonant, only a rather dissonant authority pattern in an inclusive unit can make it highly congruent with the subsidiary units. This is the gist of what hypothesis 7 argues, the "specific societies" referred to being those in which (2) and (3) are the case.

There is also a complex way in which dissonance might more directly have a net positive effect on performance without necessarily violating the general consonance hypothesis. We use the term "governmental performance" as a multidimensional variable; we regard authority patterns also as multidimensional; and we have surmised that special aspects of authority will, in all probability, especially closely affect special aspects of performance, in addition to the relationships posited between overall performance and

authority patterns. It follows that some aspects of performance may be positively affected by special aspects of authority, even if these are dissonant with others. If we add the postulate (not altogether implausible) that high performance in any one respect will itself tend to increase high performance in others--e.g. that high output efficiency increases legitimacy, and high legitimacy increases strife avoidance and durability--then it follows that dissonance may, in specified cases, engender a chain reaction among the performance dimensions that results in a net gain in overall performance levels.

This argument, however, is put here only as a possibility. It rests on too many untested assumptions to be stated with assurance. Not only does it assume special relations among performance and authority dimensions that largely remain to be discovered; it also presupposes an order of potency among the performance dimension that we do not actually know to exist; e.g. that the repercussions of conditions promoting high performance on one performance dimension, such as output efficiency, are not likely to be commensurately reduced by any making for low performance on others. The latter assumption would certainly be obviated if one could show that the various elements of a dissonant authority pattern severally promote high performance in its several aspects, thus dispensing with the supposition of a chain reaction among the performance dimensions. But this implies such another host of assumptions that it had better also be mentioned only as a possibility which nothing said so far actually precludes.

The notion of benign dissonance, it might be added, has been used before, in different language and more intuitively, in political studies. It figures, for example, in another common and not implausible argument about democracies: namely, that their success requires in them both an "authoritative" and a "liberal" principle: a source of energy and decisions by rulers as well as a source of constraint and influence upon them. The very two words used in the concept of "representative government" seem to imply such an apparently dissonant combination. In our language, we could say the same thing roughly as follows: a governmental authority pattern must not inherently hamper output efficiency, but it must also not be such as to inherently reduce legitimacy, especially not if the lack of one may compound shortcomings in the other; and an optimum solution of this problem may well be a mixture of elements in the pattern that are to an extent dissonant with one another.

But now a problem must be faced. If the notion of benign dissonance (and of malign consonance) is used without specific qualifications, one comes perilously near annihilating hypothesis 2, rather than just weakening it compared to hypothesis 1. Certainly, if no specific limits are put on kinds of dissonance considered reconcilable with high performance, the second hypothesis will become untestable and pointless, since contrary results could then always be explained away. If dissonance is found with high governmental performance it could, for that reason alone, be held benign and the hypothesis saved; the same thing could be done by labeling malign any consonance found with low performance. This is tantamount to calling any x "not-x" if it is associated with "not-x" results. Hence the need for the phrase "specific kinds of dissonance" in the seventh hypothesis.

Two criteria of benign dissonance have already been implied. The first is that one should be able to show--on general principle, not just on the basis of an argument devised to cover a particular case--that the dissonance indeed promotes congruence. The other is that one be able to show, again on general principle, that it promotes high performance on some special aspect or aspects of performance. To these a third, at least equally important, should be added: dissonance should appear in a form significantly reducing the likelihood that anomaly among elements will be perceived or acutely felt by the actors in a social unit (for the psychological predicates of consonance theory will not operate to the extent that this occurs).

Several conditions under which the perception of "objective" anomalies is likely to be reduced can be specified. (1) Relatively moderate dissonance is less likely to be perceived, and is certainly less likely to be sensed acutely, than relatively high dissonance. Hypothesis 2.1 should therefore hold, regardless of anything postulated in other hypotheses, at a very high threshold of dissonance (one considerably above the midpoint of a dissonance scale).

(2) As previously stated, dissonance will tend not to be perceived or sensed acutely if previous learning has engendered a tolerance for it--led to its being considered "natural" or otherwise expected. When that probability was mentioned above, it was held to exist only "within not inconsiderable limits." These limits are set by the threshold mentioned in the preceding paragraph (so that the language previously used should not be regarded as mere hedging).

(3) Most important, the perception of dissonance will be reduced if the elements of a pattern appear compatible to the actors, even if they are not perceived as mutually reinforcing or, indeed, appear to an external observer not even to be "permissively" related, in Osgood's sense.²⁶ Since the perceptions of actors are culturally variable, one cannot really specify abstractly when this will be the case. However, specific substantive characteristics of an authority pattern may well have an inherent affinity for being perceived to be compatible with one another, regardless of culture. An example to anchor this point was given in the study of Norway. Norwegians--at least so it was argued--have highly egalitarian and consensual norms; they especially value political equality and basing political decisions on wide, preferably unanimous, agreements. They also hold norms that were labelled "functional deference" in the study; these are norms that make for special respect toward men who are skilled, experienced or especially interested in a particular technical, professional or other occupational domain, leading to a tendency to allow "expert" judgments to prevail in decisions chiefly concerned with the special domains. The first two sets of norms provide constraints in the Norwegian polity, the third gives it energy and decision. Now obviously, egalitarianism and consensualism are objectively opposed to any kind of deference; the latter is the opposite of equality, and unthinking acceptance of the judgments of others is hardly the same as having come independently to share their position. But if equality and consensus are to be combined smoothly with any version of deference whatever, then deference to special achievements open to all men and restricted to highly specific functional realms provides a nearly ideal solution. In such a case one tends at least not to form judgments contrary to those of "experts" in the first place; and it is always possible to regard oneself as a man's general equal if his superiority is conceded only within narrow bounds, and more possible still to do so if deference by oneself toward another is matched by a corresponding deference by him toward oneself. Where functional deference is a widely held norm, broad agreements also become easy to generate, for the segments that might prevent them are necessarily small. Subtle minds will insist that these norms are anomalous, but most people do not have very subtle minds.

(4) A final surmise relevant to this point has been propounded by Nordlinger.²⁷ It is that dissonance may not be destructive (presumably because of the way it is perceived) if a dissonant mixture of norms is found in all, or most, of the members of a social unit, rather than resulting from the way different sets of consonant norms are distributed among its segments. It is one thing to have, say, egalitarian and deferential norms intermixed in people, and quite another to have a group of pure egalitarians and a similar group of pure deferentials in a single social unit. Nordlinger holds the first pattern to be benign (and, by and large, associates it with the British polity), the second to be malign (and, by and large, associates it with France). The position rests on a good deal of evidence and reasoning and seems persuasive, certainly where the other specified conditions of benign dissonance obtain, even if not as an alternative to them.

V. Adaptation

Although hypotheses 1 - 7 permit the deduction of dynamic processes (e. g. "if congruence increases, governmental performance is likely to increase") the relations they state essentially are static. The remaining hypotheses are more directly concerned with dynamics, but far less important in the project than those already sketched, chiefly because their investigation calls for historical or longitudinal studies that we can carry out only within narrow limits. For this reason, they are discussed here very cursorily, and more to indicate lines of thought than to establish their plausibility.

Adaptation

Hypothesis 8: Incongruent authority patterns tend to change toward greater congruence.

Hypothesis 9: Dissonant authority patterns tend to change toward greater consonance.

Hypothesis 10: High congruence and consonance tend to inhibit changes in authority patterns.

Hypotheses 8 and 9 address the question of what, besides impaired performance, occurs when authority patterns are in fact highly incongruent or dissonant. They were formulated as simple analogies from cognitive dissonance theory, which postulates, with much evidence, that men experiencing cognitive dissonance tend, in a number of ways, to alter cognitions toward greater consonance, especially when dissonance is considerable (e. g. through the investment of "intensity" in the cognitions). These hypotheses can, however, be argued on other grounds as well. A high level of governmental performance is certainly a requisite for a well-functioning society; although a small measure of rule may be a fairly common value, ineffective rule is rarely valued in itself and militates against attaining other values. Responses to ineffective rule need not, of course, be intelligent. Even if congruence and consonance do strongly govern the level of governmental performance, men need not realize that this is so and act accordingly. At a minimum, however, hypotheses 8 and 9 should hold if worded to posit change in an unspecified direction; and there is evidence to suggest that men (especially rulers) often "sense" the consequentiality of congruence and dissonance even

when they do not "realize" it, their social sensitivity no doubt reinforced by the more personal difficulties inherently experienced in incongruent and dissonant situations. By the same token, if hypotheses 8 and 9 are valid on the grounds stated, hypothesis 10 must also hold, as their corollary.

The hypotheses do not imply that greater congruence must in fact be the outcome of adaptive change. Institutions often resist change in specific directions, or even altogether; adaptive changes may be offset by other kinds of changes in other realms; a "lag" effect between units or dimensions may come into play; men sometimes do wrong things for right reasons; functional requisites peculiar to specific units may militate against their adaptation to others. The hypotheses only imply that changes in authority will occur or be attempted "in the direction" of lesser incongruence or dissonance, which means, at a minimum, that changes in authority consequent upon low congruence or consonance can be best understood as attempts to raise their level and will in most cases actually increase them.

The adaptive change toward congruence posited in hypothesis 8 may be accomplished in two ways that need distinction. One is a change in the authority patterns of one or more existing social units. The other is the nucleation of "intermediary" units that separate previously contiguous units and increase "relative congruence" even if not congruence in the "absolute" sense. Among other things, this should help explain why the wide existence of typical intermediary units like voluntary associations correlates well with the stability of democracies (or at least the absence of phenomena that almost certainly militate against it)--although this is a complex matter requiring more elaborate discussion than can be provided here.

Two simple points about it, however, can be briefly made. The effects on governmental performance of intermediary units, assuming the validity of the hypotheses presented here, obviously cannot be inferred directly from the fact that they are intermediary; these effects depend on the specific structures of the units, which may increase as well as lessen incongruence, or make no difference. And even if they lessen it, their intermediacy need not imply that very high levels of incongruence between the units that they separate can always safely persist. Intermediary units reduce incongruence only if they are themselves highly congruent with the more inclusive units. If

they are, they will also be rather incongruent with the preexisting subsidiary units-- which ought in turn to impair, to some degree, their own performance. As a result, there should be pressure to modify even non-adjacent units toward at least moderate congruence with one another, i. e. toward the point where one can speak meaningfully of the existence of "graduated resemblances" among all the units. (The present discontents about "participation" in institutions rather remote from popular governments-- a term by no means applicable to conventional democracies alone--are certainly explicable on this basis.)

The Direction of Adaptation

Hypothesis 11: Adaptation occurs toward conformity with the less labile units or dimensions.

Hypotheses 8 and 9 only posit a tendency toward adaptive change in incongruent and dissonant patterns; they say nothing about which units among those that are incongruent, or which dimensions among those that are dissonant, are most likely to undergo such change. Hypothesis 11 deals with this problem.

The monograph of 1961 was widely taken to imply that incongruence among governmental and social authority patterns can only be reduced by changing the governmental pattern. Actually, it neither took nor implied that position. Those who interpreted it otherwise were reading into it the widespread, and quite unfounded, belief that "social" structures are always somehow natural givens and "political" ones always artificial contrivances. There may be a measure of truth in this belief, but it can hardly be assumed. The sensible view to take, at least initially, is that adaptive change can occur at either end or both, and will be likely to occur in one direction or the other under specifiable conditions. This raises the question that hypothesis 11 seeks to answer: what will change toward conformity with what else in the process of adaptation?

The hypothesis proposes an analogy to the proposition that forces take the path of least resistance among those along which they might move. "Lability" simply means proneness to change or, concomitantly, weakness to resist modification. It seems plausible, *prima facie*, to assert that if pressure to change toward mutual conformity or harmony occurs between two or more units or dimensions, the more labile will

change in the direction of the less. But this assertion is quite empty unless general conditions making for and against social lability are specified. If they are not, the actual occurrence of change becomes the only test of lability, and hypothesis 11 becomes circular and trivial--although this does not preclude empirical research on proneness to change as an aid to specifying such conditions.

We expect, at present, that four factors will affect the degree of lability of social units. These can be stated in a series of hypotheses that elaborate hypothesis 11 in a manner required to keep it from being truistic.

Hypothesis 11: Lability varies inversely with strength of institutionalization.

This means primarily that the more deeply the norms or other expectations of behavior of social units or their dimensions are internalized the less labile will be the units or dimensions, and that ineffective socialization (the process leading to the internalization of norms and other expectations) has the opposite effect. It is necessary to add that we know something about factors affecting strength of socialization. As a general rule, for example, early socialization implants norms more strongly and deeply than late socialization, and contrary socialization influences operating simultaneously tend to prevent effective socialization at any stage of the learning process.

Hypothesis 11.2: Lability varies directly with vulnerability to manipulation.

This means simply that lability increases with accessibility to direct engineering, especially that which may result from prescriptive rules. In general, the more intimate, spontaneous, and simple relations among men--e.g. friendships or amorous relations--are far less susceptible to external manipulation, least of all by formally prescribed directives, than more public, standardized, and complex relations; a large factory, for instance, is generally more accessible to social and legal engineering than a small domestic business or farm--which tells us something about the frequent animus of revolutionary transformers against intimate and atomized relations, their frequent obsession with the legal transformation of such social relations, and their equally frequent failure actually to accomplish it.²⁸

Hypothesis 11.3: Lability varies inversely with the extent to which social units, or their dimensions, are associated with, or functionally required for, highly valued goals or other ultimate values.

This probably requires no elaboration: it merely asserts that resistance to change will be great not just in regard to anything valued in itself (through the strong internalization of norms) but also in regard to anything valued, rightly or wrongly, through association with unquestioned values. The unquestioned values may, of course, be anything at all, although ultimate values typical of types of societies or stages of social development can be specified.

Hypothesis 11.4: Lability varies inversely with capacity to control or resist.

If questions are not to be begged this clearly requires, in turn, a knowledge of what makes for such potential, a problem that itself calls for substantial research and reflection. But some factors are rather obviously relevant to the matter, most obviously of all the ability to wield violent sanctions or impose other severe deprivations, and, little less obviously, technical and administrative skill and resources of wealth and numbers.

Lability is greatest where the four factors that make for it coalesce: where institutionalization is weak, vulnerability to manipulation is great, a set of relations is not associated with intensely valued goals, and the ability to control or resist is low. Where they do not coalesce, measurements, including the possible weighting of factors, are ideally required that we are not presently prepared to make and that call for major reflection and research in their own right, although judgments based on awareness of the criteria of lability will probably suffice as a makeshift for our present purposes. It should, however, be clear that an inherently greater lability of any social unit vis-a-vis others cannot be assumed under these criteria, certainly not that of governments. One might expect the first two factors to make governments generally rather labile: political socialization usually occurs later than other kinds of learning and we know from much experience that governments are highly vulnerable to (not always efficacious) engineering. On the other hand, governments certainly tend to have a preponderant power to control

and resist, and nowadays, in the age of what Apter calls "political religions," they are frequently the objects of intense ultimate values or considered indispensable instruments for attaining unquestioned goals. Whether governments are more likely to change than other social units, or vice versa, thus is very much an open question, to be answered by study of and reflection on the balance of forces in particular situations, not by facile biases.

The Failure of Adaptation

Hypothesis 12: Adaptation tends to fail to the extent that the lability of units or dimensions is symmetric.

If one postulates that adaptation toward congruence or dissonance may fail, it becomes necessary to state when it is or is not likely to do so. Hypothesis 12 attempts to state the required condition, for cases in which the earlier mentioned "accidental" factors that may prevent successful adoption do not seem clearly responsible for failure. It is, of course, derived from hypothesis 11, although not a strict corollary of it, since that hypothesis may just as logically imply mutual change toward conformity among equally labile units or dimensions. Failure to adapt is, however, at least as likely an outcome where labilities are equal, or nearly so, and many actual cases in point could be cited (e.g. the presently common coexistence of potent governments strongly valued for the sake of "modernization" with strongly institutionalized family, tribal, ethnic, and status structures highly inaccessible to direct manipulation).

Two quite different kinds of symmetrical lability need to be distinguished. One occurs where all the units (or dimensions) are "strong"; in that case, one has a situation analogous to irresistible forces meeting immovable objects. The second occurs where all are "weak," a situation analogous to weak forces encountering weak resistance. In the first case, we may expect continuously low performance at high cost (e.g. in violent damage or simply prolonged and strenuous exertion). In the second, continuously low performance at low cost is more likely. The extremely prolonged, strenuous, and costly clashes between the potent revolutionary government of the USSR and the strongly institutionalized and highly inaccessible tribal structures on the USSR's periphery illustrate the first situation;²⁹ the second seems typical, at least until recently, of many Latin American societies.

Disequilibrium

One problem raised by the discussion still remains: if both congruence and dissonance are high, what can lead to their disequilibrium--reduce them? Disequilibrium obviously must be possible; otherwise governments that perform well would never change. Nevertheless, we have not formulated any hypotheses relevant to the problem, partly because doing so is troublesome, but also, and much more important, because the answer must be found outside of the characteristics of authority patterns themselves, if our hypotheses are valid. The reasons are that high performance solidifies institutions and that we have hypothesized both a tendency toward congruence and consonance if they are low and resistance to change if they are high.

Suppositions relevant to the problem can be offered. Disequilibrium can most obviously result from the external imposition of a governmental authority pattern. It can also follow from change in the scale of a government or society, or change in the scale of governmental activities, or changes in technology, or change in the mobility (especially cross-cultural mobility) of a people, or from new, intellectually acquired values and what is requisite to their realization. These, however, are only surmises.

We do not mean to deride the problem of disequilibrium by guesswork. It obviously deserves utmost attention. But that attention is more apropos outside of the present project than in it, since the problem leads into a universe of variables quite different from those around which our work is organized--even if that work provides, as it well may, clues to the nature of the variables. Just for this reason, the problem of disequilibrium provides the most likely link between our studies and those of others concerned with social and political dynamics.

VI. Summary and Conclusion

A general overview of the theoretical concerns of the project, and the other concerns engendered by them, can now be sketched.

(1) The project is intended mainly to investigate three types of relations between the performance levels of polities and their authority patterns. In descending order of priority, probable importance, the amount of thought already devoted to them, and how directly and thoroughly they will be studied, they are:

- (a) The relation between overall governmental performance and the congruence of governmental and social authority patterns.
- (b) The relation between such performance and the consonance of governmental authority patterns.
- (c) The relation between special performance dimensions and special aspects of the authority patterns.

(2) To study these relations it has been necessary to devise an "analytic scheme" of concepts for characterizing any and all authority patterns, both in considerable detail and in a manner permitting rigorous comparisons. It has been necessary similarly to break down the idea of governmental performance. The concepts formulated for these purposes have had to be operationalized in two senses: they have had to be translated into guidelines for field research, and scaling procedures have had to be devised for summarizing data, so that judgments of congruence and consonance will not be merely impressionistic.

(3) Relating both congruence and consonance to overall governmental performance levels leads to a necessary attempt to relate them to one another and to specify their probable or necessary combined effects on governmental performance.

(4) For some purposes it may also be necessary to relate performance on some dimensions to performance on others, and thus to overall performance as well. If such relations exist, it should be possible to distinguish from one another dimensions of authority more or less crucial to performance in the general sense.

(5) Although dynamic processes can be deduced from the hypotheses formulated for our major purposes, certain questions about the dynamics of authority relations

require additional hypotheses. Into two of these an aspect of authority patterns not used in other hypotheses (their "lability") has been introduced. And one of the questions (that of disequilibrium) requires linking our variables to others exogenous to the characteristics of authority patterns themselves.

In the end, all of the relationships posited in the hypotheses ought to form a full "theoretical system": a set of propositions derived from a limited number of simple postulates, exhaustive, internally consistent, formulated without the introduction into the system of extraneous considerations--and, hopefully, able both to explain phenomena in the concrete world and to account for the strengths and weaknesses of propositions relating other x-variables to our y-variable. Such a theoretical system is what I understand the term "general theory" to denote in its strict sense.

That end, however, is remote--in part at least because being relevant to phenomena has been given priority over the logical manipulation of postulates, in the manner of "middle-range" theorizing. Attempting to achieve a general theory in the above sense hardly seems worthwhile until some of its crucial constituent parts have been thoroughly investigated and confirmed. Nor need the required work wait until all the possible constituent parts of the system of propositions have been conceived. Not all the relations that would constitute such a system have been formulated or even thought of, nor have the relations tentatively postulated been adequately interrelated. Nevertheless, at least the outline of the system has taken shape and some progress has been made toward filling it out.

Since limited resources imply limited goals, we intend, as stated, to concentrate first and mainly on hypothesis 1 and its elaborations, if only because we came to it first and wish to study social authority patterns for their intrinsic interest and great neglect in social studies. The findings of the project should, however, be pertinent also to the other hypotheses here outlined--or reveal the vanity, in all respects, of the whole undertaking.

In some previous reactions to the project, dismay was expressed about our avoiding all "practical" issues of policy and conduct. These reactions are preposterous, but have occurred commonly enough to warrant a rejoinder.

It is hard (for me) to imagine anything more relevant to public conduct and policy than work on the conditions of high and low governmental performance. Such work is obviously required if one wishes to improve, or for that matter to impair, governmental performance by deliberate contrivance. It is also necessary if one wishes to make intelligent prognoses about the performance prospects of governments, one's own or those of others, or the probable effects on governmental performance of particular courses of action or developments. Contrivances are constantly used toward such ends; prognoses of this kind are constantly made, and fateful actions are based upon them. We certainly hope to reduce the amount of mere conjecture, misjudgment, and blind muddle that must afflict these activities while the theoretical understanding they presuppose is largely lacking. It must be recognized, of course, that the translation of theory into application requires considerable ingenuity in itself, and that theoretical understanding sometimes closes or restricts possibilities previously thought to be wide open. But theoretical understanding remains a requisite for intelligent contrivance, and the ability to discern genuine possibilities and foreclosed options surely is a part of practical wisdom.

Notes and References

1. Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1953, pp. 94-97.

2. This is not to say that all social relations involve authority, of course. Non-authority relations can occur both in and outside of units that have authority structures. Some types of interaction that do not involve authority are:

- a. Pure exchange relations, like those between buyers and sellers in free market situations. Most genuine bargaining and contractual relations come under this heading.
- b. Unintentional acts of "control," in Dahl and Lindblom's sense of the term (cf. note 1); these are actions that influence those of others without being meant to do so.
- c. Purely autonomous actions that follow no explicit or implicit prescriptions.
- d. Improvised adjustments (like those made when strangers casually encounter one another).
- e. Purely competitive relations of all kinds.
- f. Purely cooperative relations.

The authority patterns of social units can be characterized not only on the dimensions outlined in the text but on the basis of the extent to which non-authority relations occur in the unit; however, information relevant to this is implied by several of the dimensions themselves, especially the influence and concordance dimensions.

3. Charles Merriam, Public and Private Governments, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944.

4. Among them are Robert L. Peabody, Organizational Authority, New York: Atherton Press, 1964; Chris Argyris, Executive Leadership, New York: Harper, 1953; Reinhard Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry, New York: Wiley, 1956; Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, New York: Free Press, 1961; Heinz Hartmann, Authority and Organization in German Management, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959; Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon,

Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1964; and Phillip Selznick, Leadership in Administration, Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957. (See also Peabody's very useful select bibliography.)

5. Cf. especially, G. E. G. Catlin, Principles of Politics, London: Allen and Unwin, 1930, and Harold Lasswell, Power: Who Gets What, When, How, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936.

6. The inventory recorded the following information for each proposition:

- a. The nature of the proposition's dependent and independent variables and the nature and strength of the relationship held to exist between them, stated in paraphrase employing standardized concepts, especially for the type and strength of relationship (e.g. x "is necessary for" y, or "strongly favors" y, or "prevents" y, etc.).
- b. The proposition in the author's own words, with citation.
- c. The definitions of the author's concepts, if any.
- d. The nature of the evidence or reasoning invoked to support the proposition, if any.

7. A major case in point is S. M. Lipset's otherwise impressive and deservedly influential Political Man, Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1960, Chs. II and III.

8. William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society, Glencoe, Ill.; Free Press, 1959.

9. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

10. Two points should be added to this summary discussion of the inventory.

(1) Obviously, no definitive testing of all the propositions gathered was undertaken; the question in each case was rather whether reflection, evidence actually cited, and apparent validity for cases we already knew about would warrant the labors of concerted testing. (2) The compilation of the inventory was continued, for the sake of coverage, after the decision to proceed along new lines was reached, but no better propositions turned up.

11. A good introduction to the study of strains and tensions as sources of individual and social problems is Wilbert E. Moore, Social Change, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963. Studies of learning and socialization are nearly innumerable, but the best comprehensive study of political socialization is Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959. Anomie theory, originating in Durkheim's classic study of suicide, is well-treated summarily in S. De Grazia, The Political Community: A Study of Anomie, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1948. The classic work on cognitive dissonance is Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957, and an excellent elaboration of the theory is presented in J. W. Brehm and A. R. Cohen, Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance, New York: Wiley, 1962. For the political culture approach, see especially Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, chs. 1 and 12.

12. Harry Eckstein, A Theory of Stable Democracy, Princeton: Center of International Studies, 1961.

13. Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

14. A discussion of that organizational format is presented in "A Note on Graduate Student Workshops," Center of International Studies, Princeton (mimeographed).

15. Some reasons for this view were spelled out in a reply to two review articles on my study of Norway. Cf. Harry Eckstein, "Norwegian Democracy in Comparative Perspective," Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning, vol. 8 (1967), 305-321.

16. Cf. above, p. 15.

17. For a succinct statement, cf. Pye and Verba, op. cit., pp. 555-560. The subject there treated is to be dealt with very fully in a forthcoming publication by several of the Committee's members.

18. Cf. for example, Geoffrey Gorer, "National Character," in Margaret Mead and Rhoda Metraux, eds., The Study of Culture At a Distance, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1953, and Etzioni, op. cit., esp. p. 12. Gorer uses congruence as a

label "for the fact that the goals of the various institutions of a society are coherently related to one another" or for social patterns "in which a small number of themes are dominant" and that consequently are not "mutually contradictory" or such as to "demand sudden changes . . . as personnel moves from institution to institution." Etzioni uses congruence as a label for certain internal characteristics of institutions; for example, he holds it to exist when the behavior of "lower participants" (subordinates) in an organization generated by "organizational power" is the same as that generated by "other factors"--in other words, when directives in an organization coincide with the subs' independently formed predispositions.

19. Cf. above, p. 2.

20. One problem additional to those discussed below should at least be mentioned here, although it concerns more the operationalization of our analytic scheme than the meaning of the concept of congruence. If congruence is measured by rank-differences on scales identifying the variable characteristics of units on a number of dimensions, it is important that the scales be interval scales, at least so that one can state with assurance that the difference between, say, a position of 5 and 4 on any scale is smaller than the difference between, say, ranks 4 and 2. Devising such scales is perfectly feasible in principle, but difficult in practice. A crucial reason for the difficulty is that the same two sets of behavior or norms can be perceived as more or less different from one another in different cultures. When we devised closed-ended questions relevant to the dimensions of authority, we tried to specify replies that could be scaled in the manner required. But at least one field study discovered early on that two responses to a question which we had assumed to be closely similar were in fact perceived, in the culture concerned, as more incompatible than all other pairs of responses. There are ways of coping with that problem, which need not be discussed here. The important point here is simply that the simple conception of congruence thus far presented presupposes anything but simple techniques of research, if it is to be put properly to work.

21. Legitimacy as a performance characteristic refers to the amount of legitimacy accorded governments. Legitimacy as an authority dimension refers to the nature of the relations considered legitimate, whether legitimacy is accorded or not.

22. The fact that political superordinates invariably are also, at a minimum, members of families may, however, account for the stress in many political "theories" on the need for congruence between state and family structure, and the relatively large number of studies that impressionistically relate political performance to family structure. We do not categorically reject the possibility of a close relationship between them in particular cases, but do assert that "secondary" structures can substantially weaken that relation; and we suspect, as have other social scientists on other grounds, that their failure to do so has much to do with the difficulties many governments have encountered where "familial atomism" prevails.

23. See the distinction between norms, forms, and practices in authority relations below, p. 39.

24. A crucial reason is elaborated below, p. 45.

25. Division and Cohesion in Democracy, pp. 33-34.

26. Cf. above, p. 38.

27. Eric A. Nordlinger, The Working-Class Tories, Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1967, pp. 212-216.

28. Gregory Massell, "Law As an Instrument of Revolutionary Transformation in a Traditional Milieu," Law and Society Review, vol. II (1968), pp. 179-228.

29. Ibid.

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13. ABSTRACT

Twelve interrelated hypotheses, presently being investigated through field research in a large number of societies, are presented and explained, together with background on how they came to be formulated and why they appear plausible enough to warrant investigation and testing through cross-national research. The object of the fieldwork is to gather data on social (i. e. non-governmental) authority patterns, using an operationalized analytic scheme of concepts that specifies dimensions of authority relations and how social units vary on them, for describing and comparing the patterns.

The principal hypotheses relate levels of governmental performance to two aspects of political authority patterns, their congruence with certain social authority patterns (hypotheses 1. 1 - 1. 3) and the internal consonance of their elements (hypotheses 2. 1 - 2. 3). The mutual relations between congruence and consonance and their combined effects on governmental performance are also discussed (hypotheses 3 - 7). Other hypotheses deal with the tendencies of authority patterns to change when they are incongruent or dissonant (hypotheses 8 - 12).

The hypotheses constitute a theoretical framework intended to have the following potentials: the construction of a theoretical system of propositions interrelating all the variables used in them; the explanation and anticipation of governmental performance levels and certain processes of political and social change; accounting for the strengths and weaknesses of existing hypotheses about governmental performance using other independent variables; and the reduction of unfounded conjectures and misjudgments in prognoses of the performance prospects of governments and in attempts to alter them.

14. KEY WORDS

authority
social unit performance
political performance
congruence
consonance
stability
strife
output efficiency
legitimacy
adaptation
social change
political change
social lability
democracy